
From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEE44552B2918975F5001D13 (b) (6)
Sent: 2/19/2020 1:58:08 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: Re: New York Times: Misinformation or Propaganda?

NIAID got nervous because we have money going to the Wuhan Institute of Virology to fund Dr. Shi and others on the Bat coronavirus project. We were asked to provide funding information.

other Rumors say the westerners (targeted mainly to US) deliberately released virus in China, which was supported by the observation at the beginning of the outbreak break that only Chinese (or Asians) were infected.

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 18, 2020, at 6:36 PM, (b) (6) wrote:

Shameful speculation and innuendo by one of our elected officials.

Senator Tom Cotton Repeats Fringe Theory of Coronavirus Origins
Senator Tom Cotton Repeats Fringe Theory of Coronavirus Origins

Scientists have dismissed suggestions that the Chinese government was behind the outbreak, but it's the kind of tale that gains traction among those who see China as a threat.

<CEA425551D8441178EE8E85B59BEC7FE.jpg>

Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas in Washington last month. On Sunday, he accused China of "duplicity and dishonesty." Credit...Anna MoneyMaker/The New York Times

<A12DA8E333B640D980351E4E8601B656.jpg>

By Alexandra Stevenson

- <!--[if !supportLists]--><!--[endif]-->Published Feb. 17, 2020Updated Feb. 18, 2020, 7:11 a.m. ET

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The rumor appeared shortly after the new coronavirus struck China and spread almost as quickly: that the outbreak now afflicting people around the world had been manufactured by the Chinese government.

The conspiracy theory lacks evidence and has been dismissed by scientists. But it has gained an audience with the help of well-connected critics of the Chinese government such as Stephen K.

Bannon, President Trump's former chief strategist. And on Sunday, it got its biggest public boost yet.

Speaking on Fox News, Senator Tom Cotton, Republican of Arkansas, raised the possibility that the virus had originated in a high-security biochemical lab in Wuhan, the Chinese city at the center of the outbreak.

"We don't have evidence that this disease originated there," the senator said, "but because of China's duplicity and dishonesty from the beginning, we need to at least ask the question to see what the evidence says, and China right now is not giving evidence on that question at all."

Mr. Cotton later walked back the idea that the coronavirus was a Chinese bioweapon run amok. But it is the sort of tale that resonates with an expanding chorus of voices in Washington who see China as a growing Soviet-level threat to the United States, echoing the anti-Communist thinking of the Cold War era.

Right-wing media outlets fan the anger. Beijing, with its heavy-handed censorship and stranglehold on information, unwittingly gives the conspiracy theories a boost.

The idea of the coronavirus as an escaped weapon has been carried through international news outlets like the British tabloid The Daily Mail and The Washington Times, which suggested that the virus was being developed as part of China's biowarfare program.

Last month, Mr. Bannon invited Bill Gertz, a Washington Times reporter, to be a guest on the inaugural episode of his radio show "War Room: Pandemic," a spinoff of his "War Room: Impeachment," which defended Mr. Trump during the Senate impeachment trial.

The Coronavirus Outbreak

- **What do you need to know? Start here.**

Updated Feb. 10, 2020

- **What is a Coronavirus?**

It is a novel virus named for the crown-like spikes that protrude from its surface. The coronavirus can infect both animals and people, and can cause a range of respiratory illnesses from the common cold to more dangerous conditions like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS.

- **How contagious is the virus?**

According to preliminary research, it seems moderately infectious, similar to SARS, and is possibly transmitted through the air. Scientists have estimated that each infected person could spread it to somewhere between 1.5 and 3.5 people without effective containment measures.

- **Where has the virus spread?**

The virus originated in Wuhan, China, and has sickened tens of thousands of people in China and at least two dozen other countries.

- **How worried should I be?**

While the virus is a serious public health concern, the risk to most people outside China remains very low, and seasonal flu is a more immediate threat.

- <!--[if !supportLists]--><!--[endif]-->**Who is working to contain the virus?**
World Health Organization officials have praised China’s aggressive response to the virus by closing transportation, schools and markets. This week, a team of experts from the W.H.O. arrived in Beijing to offer assistance.
- <!--[if !supportLists]--><!--[endif]-->**What if I’m traveling?**
The United States and Australia are temporarily denying entry to noncitizens who recently traveled to China and several airlines have canceled flights.
- <!--[if !supportLists]--><!--[endif]-->**How do I keep myself and others safe?**
Washing your hands frequently is the most important thing you can do, along with staying at home when you’re sick.

<36F02328861149289834C2F8DF6AB97F.png>

“Bill Gertz had an amazing piece in The Washington Times about the biological labs that happen to be in Wuhan,” Mr. Bannon said on his Jan. 25 show. Mr. Gertz appeared on another show several days later to continue putting forward the bioweapons theory.

Fox News has also dabbled in the theory, [in one article](#) drawing a connection between a 1980s thriller by Dean Koontz that “predicted coronavirus.” The book is about a Chinese military lab that creates a biological weapon.

The Chinese authorities say the outbreak began in a market in Wuhan where wild animals were sold. The city is also home to a biochemical laboratory.

Although much remains unknown about the coronavirus, experts generally dismiss the idea that it was created by human hands. Scientists who have studied the coronavirus say it resembles SARS and other viruses that come from bats. While contagious, so far it appears to largely threaten the lives of older people with chronic health issues, making it a less-than-effective bioweapon.

A [plethora of misinformation](#) has led World Health Organization workers to call it an “infodemic.”

Spreading that information are some well-known critics of the Chinese government like Mr. Bannon and Guo Wengui, a [Chinese fugitive billionaire](#). The two have pledged to raise a [\\$100 million fund](#) to investigate corruption, help people they believe to be victims of Chinese government persecution and, in Mr. Guo’s words, take down China’s Communist Party.

Hours after Mr. Cotton made his comments on Fox News, Mr. Guo took to his own media platform, G News, to boast in a 30-minute video that he had predicted that China would manufacture a crisis like the virus outbreak.

“I said a year ago that Chinese Communist Party might create a massive humanitarian crisis or a natural disaster or a pandemic before it dies,” Mr. Guo said from his \$68 million apartment on the edge of Central Park in New York.

“On a wall at the entrance to Wuhan P4 lab, there is a slogan: When you step into this building, you enter into Pandora’s box,” Mr. Guo added, referring to the high-security lab.

He claimed that the lab has military connections, including that soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army serve as guards. He did not offer proof.

Mr. Guo is no stranger to conspiracy theories. The website for G News — which carries the slogan “Truth, Freedom” — is populated with headlines like “Breaking news: China will admit

coronavirus coming from its P4 lab” and “Dead: founder of Canada’s P4 Lab, key to Wuhan coronavirus investigation.”

He has also advanced other claims without evidence. In 2018, he claimed that HNA, a Chinese conglomerate, had played a role in the death of its co-chairman, Wang Jian, in an accident in France. The French authorities ruled Mr. Wang’s death an accident. The company declined to comment at the time on Mr. Guo’s claims.

Mr. Guo waged his war against the Chinese government from Facebook and Twitter for months, but then both social media platforms suspended his accounts after he posted the personal information of Chinese people online.

Mr. Guo has had more success as views about China in Washington have grown more sinister. Mr. Cotton on Sunday helped make them part of the American political establishment.

Speaking to the Fox News anchor Maria Bartiromo, Mr. Cotton suggested that a dearth of information about the coronavirus’s origins was raising more questions than answers.

“We don’t know where it originated, and we have to get to the bottom of that,” he said on the program “Sunday Morning Futures.”

After receiving criticism for lending credence to what has been largely considered a fringe theory, the senator took to Twitter to say that he did not necessarily think the virus was an “engineered bioweapon.”

That idea, he said, was just one of several hypotheses that included the possibility that the outbreak was a “deliberate release.”

He also said it was possible that the virus had spread naturally, “but almost certainly not from the Wuhan food market.”

Cao Li contributed research.

(b) (6)







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Sent: 2/26/2020 5:15:17 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: US Responds to Coronavirus

Indeed. No NIH people at post. 2 CDC direct hire only + the health attache. Not sure how many FDA people left due to the ordered departure.

Chinese from the embassy in DC came to meet with NIAID and last week with BARDA. They wanted information on drug, vaccine, and diagnostic development in the U.S. and the companies. But when we asked about reciprocal information they immediately turned the subject around and asked us something else. They are not sharing any with us. I think if I were still in China, I probably could get more info from the Grape Vine . But I am not there and my institute doesn't recognize and value my 6 years' experience in China. This hurts the most.

I am moving away from China work and go back to be a program officer again overseeing therapeutic countermeasure development contracts which will include those antivirals active against the new coronavirus.

EcoHealth has been in the news lately. I heard Peter and a couple of researchers from EcoHealth in the NPR news.

Thanks for USAID to fund the GVP project (NIAID also funded the coronavirus in Bats in WIV). The previous research we funded made the identification of the SARS-CoV-2 almost immediately.

See you soon and we have a lot to catch up.

Ping

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 26, 2020 11:59 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: FW: US Responds to Coronavirus

FYI. Note reference to the fact that we downsized our presence in Beijing among other things that may have slowed our ability to monitor and respond.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 26, 2020 11:57 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: US Responds to Coronavirus

White House

As Trump paints rosy picture of coronavirus, his own health officials sound alarm

The president could be heading into the peak of his re-election bid with the virus affecting economic growth and depressing the stock market.

Coronavirus fears tank markets but Trump says everything's under control

Feb. 26, 2020, 9:01 AM EST / Updated Feb. 26, 2020, 10:33 AM EST

By Shannon Pettypiece, Rebecca Shabad and Haley Talbot

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WASHINGTON — This week, federal health officials warned Americans to prepare for the coronavirus to become a pandemic, stocks tumbled on fears of just how widespread the virus could get, and the White House sought \$2.5 billion from Congress to fight the deadly infection.

But in the telling of President Donald Trump, everything is fine.

The media, he tweeted Wednesday, is "doing everything possible to make the Caronavirus [sic] look as bad as possible, including panicking markets, if possible. Likewise their incompetent Do Nothing Democrat comrades are all talk, no action. USA in great shape!" he said, announcing a 6 p.m. ET press conference addressing the issue.

With his re-election clearly in focus — Trump spent last week on the West Coast hosting high-priced fundraisers and holding three political rallies — there is little incentive politically for him to echo the growing concerns of the global health community.

But with public health officials warning the virus is far from being contained, Trump could be heading into the peak of his re-election bid with the virus affecting economic growth and depressing the stock market — two key selling points for his pitch.

Stocks fell sharply Tuesday for a second day in a row and bond yields tumbled on rising concern that the global economy will face a significant blow because of the spreading virus — despite attempts by the president's top economic adviser to argue otherwise.

"We have contained this. I won't say airtight, but pretty close to airtight," Larry Kudlow said on CNBC on Tuesday.

Health experts disagreed. "This is like trying to control the wind, we will see serious problems here in the United States and no amount of political rhetoric will over-trump the science of what we have here," said Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota.

Past presidents have used moments of national emergency to bring the country together and project the image of a strong commander in chief, like George Bush following the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks or Barack Obama when Hurricane Sandy hit days before his re-election. But Trump has shown an unwillingness to do so when past opportunities have presented themselves, like with Hurricane Maria.

The response to the coronavirus is already off to a polarizing start with Democrats and Trump criticizing each other Tuesday, and the president appearing to be operating off a different set of talking points than his top scientists.

Trump told reporters while traveling in India on Tuesday that he thought the virus in China was "a problem that's going to go away," and downplayed the mortality rate for a pathogen that has been confirmed to have killed 2,700 people.

He also said a vaccine, which hasn't yet begun the monthslong process of human testing, is "very close" — even as other officials warned it could be more than a year away.

And while Trump was traveling in India, he told reporters he hadn't been paying very close attention to the situation over the previous two days because he had been preoccupied with the trip.

"You may ask about the coronavirus, which is very well under control in our country," he told reporters at a press conference before heading back to Washington, D.C. "We have very few people with it, and the people that have it are, in all cases, I have not heard anything other. Maybe there's something new, because for two days I haven't been seeing too much of that news because it's been very all encompassing."

Officials warn of coronavirus spread in the United States

In less than a month since the virus was officially declared a public health emergency, the number of confirmed cases globally has risen to more than 81,000, with the virus quickly spreading throughout Europe, with Italy hardest hit so far with 300 confirmed cases in recent days.

On Tuesday, Trump rejected the comparisons between the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak, which killed 11,310 people in West Africa, and the much more easily spread coronavirus, pointing to the lower mortality rate with the coronavirus. "There's a very good chance you're not going to die. It's just the — it's very much the opposite. You're talking about 1 or 2 percent, whereas in the other case, it was a virtual 100 percent. Now they have it, they have studied it, know very much. In fact, we're very close to a vaccine."

It was a perspective in stark contrast to that of the country's top health officials. Shortly after Trump's remarks, Dr. Nancy Messonnier, director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, warned "it's not so much of a question of if this will happen in this country anymore, but a question of when this will happen" and told the public to "prepare for the expectation that this might be bad." Dr. Anthony Fauci, head of the the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, told NBC News it could be at least a year before a vaccine is widely available, and said the mortality rate in China was closer to 2 to 2.5 percent.

Behind the scenes at the White House, the administration has been working to mount a coordinated response with the acknowledgement they are dealing with a situation that could cost the lives of thousands of Americans. The White House put together a coronavirus task force last month, led by Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar, a former drug company executive who was walking a fine line this week between acknowledging the concerns of the scientists he oversees while reflecting Trump's laissez-faire posture.

The White House could find itself hobbled in its response by cuts to programs over the past three years designed to act in just such a scenario. The White House has reduced the budget for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and eliminated several key positions focused on responding to a pandemic, including having a CDC staffer in China working with disease detectives there to quickly identify and contain new pathogens, according to Dr. Tom Frieden, the former head of the CDC under the Obama administration.

The White House also lost its head of global health security in 2018 during a restructuring of the National Security Council under then-national security adviser John Bolton. The Trump administration has also changed the way the U.S. manages its stockpile of medical equipment, such as respirators and face masks needed by health workers, which Frieden warned would make it much more difficult for those resources to be quickly and effectively allocated.

Democratic response

On Monday, the White House sent over to Congress a budget plan for \$2.5 billion that would provide funds to speed up vaccine development and production, and stockpile protective equipment. Administration officials briefed members of Congress about the actions they were taking Tuesday.

The funding request quickly came under fire from Democrats, who called it inadequate.

"Here in the United States, the Trump administration has been caught flat-footed. The administration has no plan to deal with the coronavirus, no plan and seemingly no urgency to develop one," Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said on the Senate floor on Tuesday, accusing the administration of a "towering and dangerous incompetence when it comes to the coronavirus."

"The Trump administration is scrambling to respond. We have a crisis, and the Trump administration is trying to build an airplane while already in mid-flight," he added.

Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., called the White House response "disastrously inadequate."

"The approach right now seems to be 'take two aspirin and call us in the morning,'" he told reporters following the administration's briefing.

Schumer unveiled an \$8.5 billion proposal for emergency funding Wednesday to combat any outbreak of the virus in the U.S. — more than three times the White House's request.

Schumer's request would include \$1.5 billion for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, \$3 billion for medical and public health preparedness, and \$2 billion for state and local reimbursements. It would also include \$1 billion for the U.S. Agency for International Development to deal with emerging health threats and \$1 billion to the National Institutes of Health for the development of a coronavirus vaccine.

"This proposal brings desperately-needed resources to the global fight against coronavirus," Schumer said in a statement. "Americans need to know that their government is prepared to handle the situation before coronavirus spreads to our communities."

Congress approved more than \$7 billion to deal with the H1N1 flu in 2009 and more than \$6 billion to fight the pandemic flu in 2006.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said after a closed-door House Democratic Caucus meeting Wednesday morning that the House plans to unveil a plan similar to Schumer's proposal, which she said addresses the need to fill vacancies in the administration. She also blasted the president for what she called an "anemic" response to the virus.

While the World Health Organization said the number of cases of the virus appeared to have reached its peak in China, it has expressed concern about the spike in cases in Italy, Iran and South Korea. There are currently 14 confirmed cases of the coronavirus in the U.S., along with 39 cases among those evacuated from the Diamond Princess cruise ship and China. But with limited testing for the virus so far, Osterholm warned that number could quickly grow.

"We need to just roll up our sleeves and say we will get through it with cool calm heads," Osterholm said. "But it is going to have a big impact on our country just like it has in China."

(b) (6)



From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEE44552B2918975F5001D13- (b) (6)]
Sent: 2/11/2020 4:30:04 PM
To: Touchette, Nancy (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=0ac9c36a14da43c0b720120c49d50867- (b) (6)]; Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: summaries of Chinese Embassy visit
Attachments: Chinese Embassy Visit to NIAID brief summary_PC.docx; Chinese Embassy Visit to NIAID_PC.docx

I added my comments and did some editing.

Ping

From: Touchette, Nancy (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 4:04 PM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: summaries of Chinese Embassy visit
Importance: High

Gayle and Ping

I am attaching here my summaries of the Chinese visit last Friday. The second attachment is the more comprehensive and somewhat rambling notes of the conversation as it took place. Somewhat repetitive although I missed a few things. The first attachment is a more focused summary where I try to organize according to topic. Please review and feel free to add/remove whatever you see fit and to correct anything I may have missed. Suggest distributin just the shorter summary.

Nancy

Nancy Touchette, Ph.D.
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REL0000484833

Chinese Embassy Visit to NIAID
February 7, 2020; 10-11 a.m.
5601 Fishers Lane, Room 3F-100

Meeting Notes

Delegation from Chinese Embassy:

- Mr. Futao Chen, S&T Minister Counsellor
- Mr. Zhongcheng Wang, S&T Counsellor
- Mr. Jiangrui Chen, S&T Second Secretary
- Mr. Mai Wan, S&T Counsellor Attaché

NIAID Participants

In room

- Mr. Gray Handley - Associate Director for International Research Affairs
- Dr. John Beigel - Associate Director for Clinical Research, Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (DMID)
- Dr. Alan Embry - Chief, Respiratory Diseases Branch, DMID
- Ms. Gayle Bernabe - Regional Officer, Office of Global Research (OGR)
- Dr. Ping Chen - International Health Specialist, OGR
- Dr. Nancy Touchette - Health Research Program and Policy Analyst, OGR

On phone

- Dr. Hilary Marston - Medical Officer/Policy Advisor, Office of the Chief of Staff
- Dr. Karen Bok - Senior Advisor, Vaccine Development, Vaccine Research Center
- Dr. Nicholas Bushar - Chief, Policy, Planning and Reporting Section; Office of Strategic Planning, Initiative Development, and Analysis
- Dr. Vincent Munster, Senior Investigator, Viral Ecology Unit, Rocky Mountain Laboratories
- Han Kan, Office of Global Affairs, HHS
- Dr. Karen Bok - Senior Advisor, Vaccine Development, Vaccine Research Center
- Dr. Nicholas Bushar - Chief, Policy, Planning and Reporting Section; Office of Strategic Planning, Initiative Development, and Analysis
- Dr. Christine Sizemore, Director of International Relations, Fogarty International Center
- Ms. Joyelle Dominique, Acting Director, OGR

Commented [CP]{1}: Duplicated

Research priorities for China:

Mr. Futao Chen, who represents the ~~Ministry~~ Ministry of Science and Technology and is coordinating nCoV research, stated that the main purpose for requesting a meeting was to hear about NIH/NIAID research and identify areas in which NIAID and China can work together. He noted that the ministry is focused on research aimed at understanding the nature of the virus. They have pursued using currently available drugs and have found encouraging results, identifying 3 potential drugs that they believe may affect the virus. They are also looking into herbal medicine remedies that may have an effect, but these results need to be confirmed.

Mr. Chen identified the following priorities of the Chinese ministry of science and technology:

- Diagnostics
- Testing available drugs for activity against nCoV
- Vaccine development

NIAID Research in Progress

Vaccines

- VRC has engineered the 2019-nCoV and stabilized the mRNA encoding the spike protein and sent to Moderna to use with their lipid nanoparticle vaccine platform (Karin Bok)
 - DMID is sponsoring a Phase I clinical trial of the VRC-Moderna vaccine candidate, known as m1273 (Alan Beigel, Alan Embry)
 - Goal is to start the Phase I study by mid-March
 - Study will involve three cohorts receiving different doses of vaccine; each participant will receive two doses 28 days apart
 - By June, hope to identify the best dose for further testing, based on safety and immunogenicity data
 - Currently drafting the Phase I protocol and will draft the Phase II/III protocol as soon as Phase I trial begins
 - Earliest a Phase II study could start would be July 2020
- RML is in the process of developing 2019-nCoV vaccine candidates (Vincent Munster)
 - Several studies funded by CEPI
 - Trying live vectors, such as adenovirus and MVA; mRNA approaches; DNA vaccines; recombinant vaccines containing SARS binding domain
 - Will test promising candidates in vitro and in animal models
 - Casting a wide net; working broadly to develop multiple vaccines; may want capacity to offer more than once vaccine

Commented [CP]{2}: RML is also working on the development of animal models for nCoV

Therapeutics

- DMID is screening landscape for currently licensed protease and nuclease inhibitors, as well as mAbs; hope to begin trials on drugs approved for other indications
- Also screening for new antibodies (Embry)
 - working with academics and companies to develop monoclonal antibodies (mAbs)
 - Screening PMBCs for Abs
 - Looking at convalescent serum from SARS patients
 - DMID can offer testing and evaluation resources, preclinical testing, toxicology, and small/large animal screening
- DMID is also setting a multi-arm study looking at remdesivir vs. placebo that will be similar to PALM study (Beigel);
 - Could add other drugs/mAbs when viable candidates identified
 - Engaging with U.S. and international networks to plan study
 - Also engaging with WHO to develop master protocol that could be used across many different studies

Commented [CP]{3}: ?

Diagnostics

- CDC takes lead in ~~establishing~~reestablishing diagnostics protocol and distributing kits to state and local health departments
- Multiple platform technologies are being incorporate into diagnostics and reagents are being made to qualify these platforms
- RML is setting up diagnostic kits for distribution to Africa; coordinating with WHO and CEPI
- DMID is working with Cepheid to get nCoV into the XPert system
- BARDA is developing a diagnostic with BioFire

Other interests

- Gray asked for information about what China is funding:
 - Dr. Chen responded that they are here to understand what we are doing and how we can collaborate
 - The delegation will report back to MOST to receive ~~guidance~~guidance on what they can share and what they are willing to do
 - NIAID staff expressed interest in learning more about:
 - viral dynamics, course of human infection
 - surveillance of human and host reservoirs
 - questions about how patients are treated, how do patients present and how can we better understand who will progress to severe disease
 - are there immunological markers that can predict disease severity
 - transmission dynamics and whether asymptomatic transmission is really occurring
 - basic pathogen biology

Summary of discussion (Gray)

- We are enthusiastic about collaborating and supporting Chinese scientists; we value collaboration and would like to move quickly past any hurdles
- We would like to contact scientists in China and to link to our U.S. scientists, particularly for developing countermeasures, animal studies, and transmission studies; we would like permission to contact Chinese scientists
- We would appreciate any advice on how we could share data and samples; for example guidance on accessing PBMCs to develop mAbs
- We would welcome the opportunity to work together on clinical protocols and to work together to make sure the WHO protocols make sense
- Do we need an ongoing coordinating mechanism , such as bilateral working group, engaging scientific leaders so we can continue this discussion;
 - We are happy to serve as coordinators/POC for research collaboration
 - May go to higher levels (HHS/BARDA) to coordinate on production
 - May want to set up subgroups to further discuss specific topics (drugs, vaccines, e.g.)
- If it helps with MOST, we are happy to exchange letters to document any collaboration

Chinese Embassy Visit to NIAID
February 7, 2020; 10-11 a.m.
5601 Fishers Lane, Room 3F-100

Meeting Notes

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- Mr. Mai Wan, S&T Counsellor Attaché

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- Ms. Gayle Bernabe - Regional Officer, Office of Global Research (OGR)
- Dr. Ping Chen - International Health Specialist, OGR
- Dr. Nancy Touchette - Health Research Program and Policy Analyst, OGR
- Dr. Marissa Tan, Johns Hopkins Preventive Medicine Fellow, OGR

On phone

- Dr. Hilary Marston - Medical Officer/Policy Advisor, Office of the Chief of Staff
- Dr. Karen Bok- Senior Advisor, Vaccine Development, Vaccine Research Center
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- Ms. Joyelle Dominique, Acting Director, OGR

Introductions

Gray Handley thanked everyone for coming, and expressed excitement for the discussion and prospect of working together. He pointed out that NIAID's coronavirus experts were in the room and on the phone and that we have substantial research activity focused on coronaviruses. He also mentioned NIAID's ability to provide direct and indirect funding, and acknowledged the robust partnerships we already have with the NSFC, CAMS, and the many Chinese investigators who have trained in the United States and participate in many of our research networks. He expressed hope that our partnership can be

rapidly expanded to work on the current 2019-nCoV outbreak, and asked that NIAID staff on the phone and in the room introduce themselves and their role in coronavirus research at NIAID.

Karin Bok, Senior advisor for Vaccine Development at the VRC; responsible for moving Phase I clinical trials into advanced development and helping coronavirus vaccine

Hilary Marston, Medical Officer and Policy Advisor to the Director; coordinating NIAID nCoV response

Nicolas Bushar, Office of Strategic Planning, Initiative Development, and Analysis; helping Hilary to coordinate nCoV response

Joyelle Dominique, Acting Director, OGR

Mukul Ranjan, Senior Advisor for Innovation and Technology Transfer, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Office; helps with tech transfer and IP issues

Christine Sizemore, Director of International Relations, FIC; helps to coordinate research activities across NIH

Han, Khan(?), Office of Global Affairs, HHS; met with Chinese Embassy delegation at HHS last week

John Beigel, Assistant Director for Clinical Research at DMID

Alan Embry, Chief, Respiratory Diseases Branch, DMID

Ping Chen, former NIAID staff in Beijing

Gayle Bernabe, Regional Program Officer for East Asia, OGR

Nancy Touchette, Health Policy and Program Analyst, OGR

Mr. Futao Chen, from the Chinese Embassy then discussed the research priorities related to the public threat from CoV of the Embassy and his role in facilitating cooperation; he represents the Ministry of Science&Technology and is coordinating CoV research. He noted that the ministry is focused on research aimed at understanding the nature of the virus. They have pursued using currently available drugs and have found encouraging results, identifying 3 potential drugs that they believe may affect the virus. They are also looking into herbal medicine remedies that may have an effect, but these results need to be confirmed. Currently, diagnostic kits are especially important, and Mr. Chen noted that six companies are providing 7 different kits that have shown to be effective for diagnosing NCoV.

He noted that results for developing a vaccine have not come so fast, with scientists from the United States and China both predicting that the earliest trial will not likely start for three months. Which for the Chinese seems to be a long time, but is a short time by NIAID standards. Mr. Chen also expressed concern that with such a long time frame for approval, companies will have less incentive to develop and manufacture vaccines for nCoV. The Chinese government is investing in vaccine research but it takes time and most of their effort has been focused on containing the outbreak. He also noted that the number of new suspected cases remains at ~5000 and may be leveling off somewhat, and not increasing exponentially; this may be a sign that they are containing the virus, according to Mr. Chen. Most cases (~2/3) are in Hubei province and the case fatality rate outside Hubei is lower.

Mr. Chen said that the first priority of the Chinese ministry of science and technology is diagnostics. Other priorities are testing available drugs for activity against nCoV and vaccine development. The main purpose for requesting a meeting was to hear about NIH/NIAID research and identify areas in which NIAID and China can work together.

Gray noted that there are always hurdles but he hopes that the delegation can help us do our job to move as quickly as possible.

Mr Jiangrui Chen, another member of the delegation, mentioned the national international service system (?) provides access to data for foreigners [something about CAMS?] he also noted that a clinical trial conducted in China identified six medications with activity against 2019-nCoV:

- Lopinavir
- Ritonavir
- Ribavirin
- Alpha-interferon
- Others(?)

Commented [CP(1)]: I thought the person is WANG Zhongcheng. He shared the information on the newly launched national research service system: <http://nmdc.cn/#/nCoV> (follow up: 2 nCoV virus isolates, primers and probes are available for researchers to use. Unclear if international researchers have the access to the materials. The site has been contacted to learn if NIAID can acquire the virus isolates).

Commented [CP(2)]: He did not mention the other two.

John Beigel mentioned that lopinavir and ritonavir are in trials to treat infected individuals (in China), but interferon is not yet in trials. He also mentioned that ribavirin was used to treat patients with SARS. Alan Embry noted that he had heard ribavirin was being considered for testing along with interferon as a potential treatment for nCoV

Gray said it would be helpful to have contact information for Chinese PIs doing coronavirus research, with permission to contact them, to facilitate collaboration between U.S. and Chinese researchers.

Karin Brook said that the VRC has experience working on coronaviruses, including MERS and SARS. They have engineered the 2019-nCoV and have been working with Moderna to put the new sequence into Moderna's RNA platform; they are working with Moderna to move from to Phase I trials to GMP production for Phase I clinical trial. The Phase I trials, which will aim to start in mid-March; 2-3 months will hopefully answer the questions: How fast can we go? And how far/fast (?) can we develop collaborations. She also noted that CEPI will be funding GMP production. She also talked about monoclonal antibodies but said they are not isolating them in-house. They have existing antibodies that might cross react with nCoV and they have also obtained blood samples from the patient in Washington State and hope to isolate antibodies from his PBMCs

Commented [CP(3)]: No idea

Gray said that it is not too early to start thinking about setting up subsequent clinical trials; it would be helpful to start identifying sites to test any vaccine candidates that make it through Phase I testing. It is not too early to start developing a clinical protocol. He also noted that U.S. scientists have been struggling to get samples and PBMCs and acknowledged the sensitivity of the subject, but asked if there is a way to manage sample sharing through an expedited process.

John Beigel said that DMID is sponsoring a Phase I vaccine study. Goal is to start the second week of March. The study will involve three cohorts receiving different doses of vaccine. Each participant will receive 2 doses 28 days apart. However, they will not know which is the best dose until June (based on safety/immunoreactivity and immunogenicity). Once the vaccine dose is determined, how do we move to a larger study to assess safety and efficacy? He noted that Moderna is interested in working with them on this trial. He said the mRNA platform allows them skip certain steps, because the safety of the platform has already been tested, and offers the speediest route to vaccine development and testing. Phase I study will begin in five weeks (if they get FDA approval). They are looking for safety/tolerability with a good immunogenic response. As soon as the protocol for the Phase I study is finished and the trial starts, they will start writing the protocol for a Phase II/III study. They will work

with the FDA and IRB to get agreement to move forward, but the earliest the Phase II study could begin would be early July. Name of vaccine is m1273. The vaccine platform was developed by Moderna. VRC devised a way to construct and stabilize the mRNA of the 2019-nCoV spike protein, then sent to Moderna to use with their lipid nanoparticle vaccine platform. VRC/NIAID could license the technology for stabilizing the mRNA to others. Other groups/companies also have lipid nanoparticle platforms.

Commented [CP(4): I believe that NIAID can license the spike protein sequence. I don't think it is the technology for stabilizing the SP.

Vincent Munster discussed RML efforts to develop vaccine candidates and said they were trying adenovirus vectors and different mRNA approaches using CEPI funding. They will test these candidates in vitro and in animal models.

Commented [CP(5): Receptor binding protein is one of the vaccine candidates in addition to the spike protein.

Alan Embry said that a number of developers are working to develop vaccine candidates. Many of these studies are funded by CEPI. The goal is to cast a wide net and try to identify to most promising candidates to move to clinical trials. He said they anticipate that the m1273 candidate will be highly immunogenic. He also talked about mAbs and that academics and companies are trying to screen PBMCs for antibodies; some researchers are also looking at serum from convalescent SARS patients for antibodies that could protect against the new virus. Alan also mentioned that DMID can offer testing and evaluation resources, preclinical testing, toxicology and small and large animal testing. DMID works to lower risk to industry in developing vaccines and therapeutics.

Gray mentioned that NIAID has issued a notice for grantees to apply for supplementary funding. The amount of supplementary awards are limited by the current grant, but Alan said that they are trying to accelerate research as much as possible. There are already many ongoing collaborations between U.S. and Chinese researchers, but the grant supplements offer real opportunities to build on joint activities. With joint programs with NSFC and CAMS, each side funds their own researchers.

Vincent discussed the international effort by NIAID to work broadly to develop multiple vaccines. With this epidemic, we may want the capacity to offer more than one vaccine. He said his lab is pursuing every opportunity. Looking at vaccine candidates containing the SARS binding domain in a recombinant vaccine candidate and is also looking at DNA vaccines, mRNA vaccines, and live vectors such as adenovirus, chimp AdOX (?), and MVA vectors. Several companies are also investigating nanoparticle vaccine platforms.

Commented [CP(6): I think so. He said chimp vector. This would be the one to use (is this the one used in the NIAID's ebola vaccine?)

In terms of therapeutics, Alan said DMID is surveying the landscape for currently licensed protease and nuclease inhibitors and monoclonal antibodies and hope to begin Phase I/II trials on approved drugs for other indications. John Beigel said they are setting up for a multi-arm study looking at remdesivir vs. placebo that will be similar to the PALM study for Ebola therapeutics. Could drop candidate drugs into different arms of the study and add mAbs when a viable candidate is identified; DMID has engaged with U.S. and international networks to plan such a study. He noted that they are also engaging with WHO to develop a master protocol that could be used across many different studies; WHO has not yet circulated their protocol. But such an approach will allow multiple trials to consolidate data. NIAID is happy to help investigators starting to plan trials, in any way they can. WE can share protocols, resources, etc. and we can provide review and expertise for the Chinese, if wanted.

One of the Chinese officials, CHEN Jiangrui, (third one from the right) asked whether American companies coordinate in any way in terms of data collection and information, and asked about the process for making interventions available for emergency use. They also asked whether anyone was ~~collecting~~ collecting or coordinating data on the clinical course of disease in patients.

Hilary Marston ~~responded~~ responded that within the USG, HHS has the lead in coordinating activities. ASPR and BARDA lead the advanced development of interventions and hand off to industry. CDC conducts some communication with physicians, but the primary mode of communication is through publications. Case reports are published individually and there is no one tasked centrally collecting information.

In terms of diagnostics, Alan explained that CDC takes the lead, establishing the diagnostics protocol and distributing kits to state and local health departments. Multiple platform technologies are being incorporated into diagnostics and reagents are being made to qualify platforms.

Vincent mentioned that RML is setting up diagnostic kits for distribution to Africa to test for nCoV and they are coordinating with WHO and CEPI.

Alan said NIAID is interested in learning more about viral dynamics, the course of human infections, surveillance of human and host reservoirs. He mentioned collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Other issues of interest include how are patients treated. How do patients present and how can we understand who will progress to severe disease. Are there immunological markers that can predict. Gray added that we are interested in these studies as well as basic biology of the virus. Also, would like to better understand transmission dynamics, host factors, and whether asymptomatic transmission is really occurring. He asked the Chinese what they could share regarding these questions.

Dr. Chen asked if we are developing any new diagnostics and John mentioned that we are working with Cepheid to get the nCoV into the Xpert system. Also, BARDA is developing Biofire as a diagnostic.

Gray asked for information about what they are funding: Dr. Chen ~~responded~~ responded that they are here to understand what we are doing and how we can collaborate. They will report back to MOST to get guidance on what they are willing to do. Gray asked about opportunities to share data and samples, and Mr. Chen acknowledged that opportunities are there, but he cannot give a clear answer at this point. He asked NIAID to provide a list of what we want, which they can send to MOST to what they are able to share.

Jiangrui Chen asked whether the Moderna platform has been used for other viruses and John mentioned that it has been used to develop vaccine candidates for influenza H7 and H10, Zika, CHIKV, and CMV. They have had to change the lipid configuration, but the current formula has been tested in 3 studies.

Commented [CP(7)]: I would say composition. The nanolipid particles are composed of 4 different lipids.

[The third person...Mr. Wang?] said they can share epi information outside of Wuhan (Wuhan epidemiology is beyond their capacity right now). But for other areas, cases are provided on a municipal website: <http://nmdc.cn/#/nCoV>

Commented [CP(8)]: The website is not for case tracing nor case reporting. WANG mentioned that in cities such as Tianjin and Shenzhen the cases are reported and can be traced to where the new cases were infected. The information is publicly available at the local health commission websites.

Mr. Chen that there is evidence for asymptomatic transmission and there are clues that it ~~can~~ occurs but studies are a big challenge. They ~~would~~ would like to know when people start and stop shedding the virus [something about 15 seconds??]

Commented [CP(9)]: They mentioned there was report that a person who walk-passed (or maybe stopped to talk to a person who was infected) was infected. The interaction was only 15 second.

Summary of discussion (by Gray)

- We are enthusiastic about collaborating and supporting Chinese scientists; we value collaboration and would like to move quickly past any hurdles
- We would like to contact scientists in China and to link to our U.S. scientists, particularly for developing countermeasures, animal studies, and transmission studies; we would like permission to contact Chinese scientists
- We would appreciate any advice on how we could share data and samples; for example guidance on accessing PBMCs to develop mAbs
- We would welcome the opportunity to work together on clinical protocols and to work together to make sure the WHO protocols make sense
- Do we need an ongoing coordinating mechanism, such as bilateral working group, engaging scientific leaders so we can continue this discussion;
 - we are happy to serve as coordinators/POC for research collaboration
 - May go to higher levels (HHS/BARDA) to coordinate on production
 - May want to set up subgroups to further discuss specific topics (drugs, vaccines, e.g.)
- If it helps with MOST, we are happy to exchange letters to document any collaboration

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEF44552B2918975F5001D13- (b) (6)]
Sent: 2/14/2020 8:10:14 PM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=1ceb55d4b673477391c9da8a3eb3c75c-h (b) (6)] Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)]
CC: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=5c55f75b58f14ab2b2ccb2c0a881ccae- (b) (6)]; Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6ad94c8f809d41ad91b1f78754f60c54- (b) (6)]; Lu, Tami (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=683d9f298f344f53b273ce527aa15d9a- (b) (6)]
Subject: Re: Working on China info
Attachments: Contacts in China for COVID-19.docx

Gray and Gayle,

See the attached contacts.

I haven't had more recent contact with Nanshan Zhong and Lanjuan Li. Can't say the emails I have are still in use.

Hope this is helpful.

Ping

On 2/14/20, 1:44 PM, "Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E]" <(b) (6)> wrote:

We have little information on where the mission will go. Likely still being worked out. They will go to Wuhan but not known where else. I think what would be best is a list of key people he may meet if he goes to certain institutions, perhaps arranged by institution and with very short note about how we have worked with or linked to each person. If it cannot be done today we may run out of time so whatever can be done will be OK.

G

-----Original Message-----

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 14, 2020 1:18 PM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
CC: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>; Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>; Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>; Lu, Tami (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: Re: Working on China info

Have been busy with the movers. Do you have idea which city he is going beside Beijing?

He should also contact CAMS president Chen Wang, and Bin Cao (running the Remdesiver trial). I gave Gray their emails before. I heard president Wang is in Wuhan.

Others include Dr. Nanshan Zhong who is named the leader of a research team to study the new virus. He is in Huangzhou. Another person Dr. Lianjuan Li who is in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. She is active on the vaccine development for this virus. I don't have their contacts at hands now. Should be easy to find online.

RJ Simonds can connect him with whoever in charge now at China CDC in addition to George.

If he goes to Shanghai we have a grantee Jianqing Xu who is in the Shanghai Public Health Clinical research center. His center treats COVID-19. I can send his email. Also our ARLG trial PI in Fudan Dr. Minggui Wang can be a contact. I will send his contact too.

Ping

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 14, 2020, at 12:24 PM, Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6) wrote:
>
> Attached are the following:
> - Short list of contacts in China
> - China country page
> - Summary of Feb. 7 meeting with Chinese embassy
> - 2019-nCoV (COVID-19) summary prepared for FSC on Feb. 6 [might need to be updated?]
>
> I presume he has the latest info on COVID-19 that Nick and others have put together?

REL0000484834

>
> Let me know if additional information is needed.
>
> Also, as I mentioned to Joyelle, Mr. Wan from the Chinese Embassy called me this morning re-
confirming that their embassy in Tokyo will issue Dr. Lane's China visa.
>
> Thanks all,
> Gayle
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
> Sent: Friday, February 14, 2020 8:46 AM
> To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E]
<(b) (6)>
> Cc: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E]
<(b) (6) Lu, Tami (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
> Subject: RE: Working on China info
>
> I think the more we can share with him the better. Please send me the package before sending.
Thanks.
>
> What a night it has been! G
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
> Sent: Friday, February 14, 2020 8:45 AM
> To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E]
<(b) (6)>
> Cc: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E]
<(b) (6) Lu, Tami (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
> Subject: Working on China info
>
> I'll update the country page and will send shortly. Does Dr. Lane need a list of contacts in
Beijing/China? I'm looping in Ping just in case.
>
> Thanks all,
> Gayle
> <Chinese Embassy Visit to NIAID brief summary_updated draft 02122020.docx>
> <2020-02-07 nCoV Update for FC.docx>
> <List of Key Contacts in China.docx>
> <China Page 2 14 2020.docx>

Beijing:

George Fu Gao, (b) (6) (b) (6)

Director-general China CDC, Professor, academician, Institute of Microbiology, former NIAID grantee, virologist/structure biology. Hosts of two NIAID participated conferences (Avian Influenza and MERS 2015; U.S.-Japan EID virology 2018)

Chen Wang, (b) (6)

President, academician, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS, also known as Peking Union Medical College, PUMC), pulmonologist, NIAID and CAMS are collaborators on annual scientific conferences since 2016. He is listed as the PI on the Gilead remdesivir clinical trials that are going on in Wuhan China. I heard that President Wang is currently in Wuhan.

Bin Cao, (b) (6)

Professor in respiratory diseases, Professor Pulmonary Critical Care Medicine Center, China-Japan Friendship Hospital. Dr. Cao is also on the Gilead remdesivir clinical trials that are going on in Wuhan China. He is the main contact for the trials. China-Japan Friendship hospital was one of the sites selected initially for ARLG conducted study but later dropped out.

Wuhan

Zhengli Shi, (b) (6)

Professor in Wuhan Institute of Virology, leading coronavirus researcher in China. Currently she is one of the Chinese collaborators on NIAID grants to AI110964 Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence, award to EcoHealth (PI: Peter Daszak)

Shanghai

Jianqing Xu, (b) (6)

Professor in Shanghai Public Health Clinical Research Center, grantee of NIH-NSFC joint funding program (U.S. collaborator: Florine Krammer) specialize in HIV and influenza.

Mingui Wang, (b) (6)

Head of the Institute of Antibiotics, Huashan Hospital affiliated to Fudan University. China PI for ARLG Multi-drug Resistant Organisms (MDRO) network.

Qian Gao, (b) (6)

Professor, Fudan University, Dr. Clif Barry's TB project collaborator in China

Guangzhou

Nanshan Zhong, (b) (6)

Respiratory disease expert. Used to be the head of Guangzhou Institute of Respiratory Diseases. He is known to many Chinese as the hero for combating SARS. He is recently named the head for a 13-member expert team to lead the COVID-19 research task force.

News reference: http://www.china.org.cn/china/2020-01/31/content_75661166_3.htm

He came to NIAID years ago to attend an influenza meeting. NIAID doesn't have collaboration with him. I visited him. Later Guangzhou Consulate and (b) (6) had visited him too.

Hangzhou

Lanjuan Li, (b) (6)

She is a hepatologist, epidemiologist, liver microbiome, had worked on Avian Influenza, academician. Her hospital, Shulan Hospital affiliated with Zhejiang University is one of the ARLG MDRO network sites. She visited NIAID about 3 or 4 years ago and met with Dr. Fauci. She is one of the members in the Key State laboratory for the diagnosis and treatment of emerging infectious diseases. She has close tie to President Xi Jinping. She has been appeared in the news on COVID-19.

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEE44552B2918975F5001D13- (b) (6)]
Sent: 2/7/2020 8:31:08 PM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=1ceb55d4b673477391c9da8a3eb3c75c- (b) (6)]
CC: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)] Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=5c55f75b58f14ab2b2ccbacc0a881ccae- (b) (6)] Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6ad94c8f809d41ad91b1f78754f60c54- (b) (6)] Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=ab30660917b942ffba9ae95d631116f3- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS
Attachments: AI110964.docx

Gray,
See the attachment I prepared previously.
This grant is on bat but can easily expand to other animals too.
Should check to see if FIC/NIAID got any award from the NSF-NSFC initiative on the ecology and evolution of infectious diseases. The participants of the workshop in preparation for this initiative are the top virus chasers in US and China.

From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 3:03 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Thanks! Do you recall who the US and Chinese PIs are on that coronavirus vector/reservoir grant are?

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 2:42 PM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Gray,
I did. Matt had given OGA the contacts for NSFC. Neither Matt nor I provided contact for CAS.
I suggested that OGA can ask NSFC for contact in CAS.
In 2018, NSF and NSFC had a joint initiative on Ecology and Evolution of infectious diseases. A workshop was held prior to the initiative (NIH is one of the participants to this initiative. Many participants of the workshop are from CAS institute including WIV scientists.

NIAID grant to EcoHealth is studying coronaviruses in animals including bats. The grant has different countries as collaborators in addition to China.

Ping

From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 2:31 PM
To: Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Cc: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Did anyone respond to OGA?

From: Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 1:58 AM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Cc: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: Re: POCs for NSFC and CAS

I have not heard about this call

On Feb 6, 2020, at 11:55 PM, Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> wrote:

This is first I have heard of this planned telcon.

We should give them the contact number they seek. Not sure we have good contact for CAS as we mostly work with CAMS, but I expect that you, Ping, have contacts for all.

Hilary, have you heard about this telcon that OS and OGA seem to be planning even before the WHO meeting is convened?

We will see the Chinese tomorrow so this may be brought up by Han Koo if she participates.

Gray

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Thursday, February 6, 2020 6:33 PM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Cc: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>; Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: Fwd: POCs for NSFC and CAS

FYI

Do we know about the telecon?
I haven't responded

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

REL0000484835

From: "Koo, Han (OS/OGA) (CTR)" <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>

Date: February 6, 2020 at 6:14:15 PM EST

To: "Brown, Matthew (NIH/NCI) [E]" <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> "Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E]" <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>

Subject: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Hi Matt and Ping,

We need POCs of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) and The Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) ASAP. Can you assist?

We are planning to coordinate a teleconference (likely Feb 17) among different partners for a larger discussion on funding basic research for the animal reservoir and evolutionary biology of nCoV based off of the WHO meeting on nCoV on the 11 and 12.

Please let me know by COB today if possible. Thank you so much.

Best,
Han

Sent from my iPhone

AI110964, Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence, award to EcoHealth (PI: Peter Daszak) with Chinese collaborators.

This award has multiple international collaborations (not just with China). China has the history of SARS. It is logical to study the coronaviruses in bat populations in China.

The total budget for 5 years (2014-2018) was \$1,045,599 to Chinese collaborators. The renewed award started 2019 and the budget is 151,901 per year for 5 years totaled at \$759,505. Please see the budget breakdowns by year under the Chinese institutes that received the funding

Six Chinese institutions were listed on the award from 2014-2018. These institutes are

Guangdong Entomological Institute <http://www.giabr.gd.cn/>

Chinese collaborator: Zhu, Guanjin (based on his publication records, he studies bats)

Wuhan Institute of Virology <http://www.whiov.cas.cn/>

Chinese collaborators: Shi, Zhengli and Ge, Xingyi (added on the third year). They both work on coronavirus.

\$133,595; 139,015; 159,122; 159,122; 159,122

East China Normal University in Shanghai <http://english.ecnu.edu.cn/>

Chinese collaborator: Zhang, Shuyi (I can't find him at the institute website. Google search found him, but his publications are not updated (latest 2009)

\$94,068; 72,684; 54,117; 42,300; 32,454

Center for disease control and prevention of Guangdong <http://cdcp.gd.gov.cn/>

Chinese collaborator: Ke, Changwen (according to google search he is a microbiologist focusing on development of laboratory diagnostics and molecular epidemiology study of infectious diseases)

Yunnan Institute of Endemic Diseases Control and Prevention
<http://www.yiedc.com/infodetail.jsp?infoid=798>

Chinese collaborator: Zhang, Yun-zhi (based on google search Zhang works on coronaviruses in animals)

School of Public Health, Wuhan University <http://en.sph.whu.edu.cn/>

Chinese collaborator: Li, Shiyue (google search finds Li's research interests are Research on the mental health problems among People living with HIV/AIDS and Investigate the influence of acculturation on human beings)

Five Chinese collaborators in three different institutes are on the renewed grant.

Wuhan Institute of Virology

Chinese collaborators: Shi, Zhengli; Hu, Ben; Zhou, Peng. Shi and Hu work on coronaviruses and Zhou on bats.

Institute of Pathogen Biology, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences
http://www.mgc.ac.cn/IPB_en/

Chinese collaborators: Ren, Lili; Guo, Li. Both work on etiology and immunology of respiratory viruses, viral and host interaction

East China Normal University

Chinese collaborator: Zhu, Guangjian (can't find this investigator by google search)

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEF44552B2918975F5001D13- (b) (6)]
Sent: 12/17/2019 11:03:45 PM
To: zhangling (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Yuelong Shu (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
Yinuo Li (b) (6) (b) (6) Shitong Huan (b) (6)
Bo Sun (b) (6)
Subject: Departing China

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

It is coming to the end of my 6 years assignment in China. My departure day is today. I will return to NIAID and probably go back to my previous office on therapeutic product development for infectious diseases.

It has been my pleasure working with you all. Your determination and contribution to the U.S.-China collaboration in biomedical research are indispensable for advancing our knowledge in all fields of biomedical science. U.S.-China relation goes up and downs but I believe the common mission for better health of populations will persist. International collaboration in science and technology is the future for scientific advancement.

Many thanks for your time and effort to provide me with guidance, suggestions, and advice over the years I have been in China. I have learned a lot on China from all of you, and will continue to support future scientific collaborations whenever I can.

Please don't be a stranger. Please let me know if you are in the Washington DC area and I would like to have the opportunity to catch up. My U.S. contact information is below. Please feel free to contact me.

Best wishes to you all and happy holidays.

Ping Chen, 陈平, PhD

U.S. Cell: (b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEEF44552B2918975F5001D13- (b) (6)]
Sent: 1/7/2020 5:35:55 PM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=1ceb55d4b673477391c9da8a3eb3c75c- (b) (6)]; Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=5c55f75b58f14ab2b2ccbac0a881ccae- (b) (6)]; Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

See the agenda at this link. <http://www.cvent.com/events/back-to-basics-research-to-address-bunyavirales-emergence/custom-19-34c289793af9409eb0eeb6c381ce6426.aspx>

George is on the agenda, speaking in Session 2 on the first day of the meeting, at 12:45 pm, on bunyavirus entry. Do you think ASF can come for the talk and then have scientist to scientist chat with George?

Ping

From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:46 AM
To: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: FW: Wuhan Pneumonia

Can we get the agenda for the meeting from DMID? Thanks. G

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:53 AM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

The outbreak was about 2-3 weeks ago. I think it is under the control. I don't see why George can't come to the meeting. I don't have the agenda for the meeting. Do we know if George is speaking?

From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:43 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

Are you sure George is still coming given the outbreak?

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:43 AM
To: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

No replacement for now. 😊

From: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:41 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>; Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

Thanks Ping! I think I forgot that you were back in Fishers lane. Welcome back!

Thanks for the info. I will let them know that George will be here next week. Do you know if there is a replacement for you in the embassy in Beijing? If so I'd love to connect with them.

Erik

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:38 AM
To: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6); Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

Hi Erik,

Happy New Year!

Do you know that I am back at OGR now? My 6 years in Beijing ended three weeks ago and had to come back.

Yes, I have been following the news. Here is what I know so far, not much though. I contacted Dr. Zhengli Shi at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (she is your grantee) and she confirmed that it is viral infection. But she won't tell me the nature of the virus. She told me to be patient and wait for the public accouchement. My friend in the US embassy in Beijing told me last night that there will be a cable coming out soon on this matter. Once I have the cable I will send to you. But I don't expect it has much scientific information in it.

Speaking of George Gao, he will be at Fishers Lane attending the bunya virus conference next Monday and Tuesday. I am sure he will have the most recent information on the virus. If Barney and Vincent are at the meeting, they can talk to him directly.

Ping

From: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:53 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: Wuhan Pneumonia

Hi Ping,

Happy New Year! I'm sure you've been following the news of the viral pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan. I was wondering if you have any information to share beyond what's already been reported in the news? And also whether you have any contacts with anyone that may have sequenced the virus, maybe someone with George Gao's group? I've been working to put together what we know so far and have been reaching out to my investigators as well. Barney Graham and Vincent Munster were particularly interested in the sequenced virus.

Thanks for your help!
Erik

Erik J. Stemmy, Ph.D.
Program Officer
Respiratory Diseases Branch
Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases NIAID/NIH/HHS
5601 Fishers Lane, Room 8E18
Bethesda, MD 20892-9825
Phone: (b) (6)
Email: (b) (6)

Getting ready to publish? Share the good news with your program officer asap! NIAID may be able to help publicize your article. And, remember to list your NIAID grant or contract number in the publication.

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Sent: 2/3/2020 4:05:30 PM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)]
CC: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=5c55f75b58f14ab2b2ccbac0a881ccae (b) (6)]; Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6ad94c8f809d41ad91b1f78754f60c54- (b) (6)]; Lu, Tami (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=683d9f298f344f53b273ce527aa15d9a- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Sure.
I only know two of the investigators and they should be on the same grant.
Erik actually is the best person to ask for this. He is the SARS and MERS program officer. Most PIs listed below are not Chinese. Are they the U.S. PIs with Chinese collaborators?
It is better for you to pull out the grants as it would take me a lot of longer to learn to use the system (I may not even have access to the internal grant database). I can look up the Chinese collaborators and their research institutes etc.
Ping

From: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 11:00 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Lu, Tami (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: FW: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hi Ping,

Andrew Ford/DMID stopped by my office to request assistance to learn more about grants and investigators working on coronavirus research. Apparently this is part of a request for ASF that is needed by today.

To respond to this request, perhaps we can divide the tasks at hand. I could look up the grant awards and compile a list together.

Perhaps you could provide/look up information on the investigators listed below on their coronavirus research and if any collaborate with China.

We can also call Andrew if there are any questions or need more info about the specific request.

Thanks,
Gayle

From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 10:39 AM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hey Gayle,

Thank you for speaking with me. Per our discussion, below are the award numbers and/or investigators we are interested in understanding more about their association with Chinese researchers/institutions. I would be happy to discuss. Thanks - Andrew

NIAID

- R01AI110700
- AI110964
- U19AI109761
- U19AI107810
- AI085524
- F32AI102561

Other NIH Institutes

- K99AG049092
- DK065988

Investigators

- Ralph Baric
- Peter Daszak
- Zhengli-Li Shi (investigator at Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China)
- Fang Li
- Richard Whitley
- Mark Denison
- Chien-Te Tseng

Andrew Q. Ford, Ph.D.

Office of Scientific Coordination and Program Operations

Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases

NIAID/NIH/DHHS

5601 Fishers Lane Room 7G64

Rockville, MD 20892

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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Sent: 7/30/2019 8:40:48 AM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=1ceb55d4b673477391c9da8a3eb3c75c- (b) (6)]; Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)]; Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=5c55f75b58f14ab2b2ccbac0a881ccae- (b) (6)]
CC: Eng, Janette (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=49c0059ac5c2400cbaa4f64ee171b824- (b) (6)]; Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]
Subject: End of July updates

Hi,

I owe you an update. I returned from my trip to the conference during the weekend in Guiyang 4 am due to extensive delays at Beijing airport. Severe weather related. I was so pleased that I made it back!

1. I sent you a detailed update on the NIAID-CAMS TB meeting in a separate email. We are making progress but slowly.
2. Joyelle and Tami asked me to brief on the Trans NIH China activity call organized by FIC. Below is my summary. Gray can fill in if I missed any point.

It was a short meeting. As the outline laid out, Matt went over first the actions table he created to track the activities for each IC and individuals.

For NIH-NSFC JWG meeting, Gray asked about the schedule, which was then briefly discussed. One event is the informal sightseeing with NSFC staff, which Matt suggested to NSFC. When he first discussed with me, I told him my concern. I don't want NSFC feels that they need to do this and would have to plan and may even offer to cover the cost. Another concern I have is informal conversation may sometimes be misunderstood. Anyway, I may be over reacting. Matt said he does this type of events and always good to spend informal time with the counterparts. I do agree with the idea but we are in a very special time period.

George Gao will host a welcome dinner on the evening of the 26.

Two embassy events are proposed by Matt, one is the limited country team meeting and another one is to jointly hold an event at Beijing American Center to let the public know about US-China collaboration in biomedical research. If NSFC can join, that would be a nice event to have. I asked if Matt has contacted the front desk to schedule the limited country team meeting, he has not. It is a good approach to meet different sections in the embassy so they can learn what NIH is doing in China and NIH people can learn about the China Mission.

Last, Matt mentioned MOUs. He described the requirements for having any MOUs or any kind of agreements with Chinese partners that each IC plans to have with China will need to go through the review process including the development of Benefits and Risk statement. He mentioned NIAID's Henan MOU, the first one went through the process and it is approved now. He offered support for ICs who need.

3. Belt and Road International Conference on Hepatobiliary Carcinoma and Infectious Disease

I flew to Guiyang to attend the Belts and Roads International Conference on Hepatobiliary Carcinoma and Infectious Diseases. It was a huge conference. I guessed more than 1000 people there at the opening on Saturday. I was asked to be the Chair for two sessions (Matt supposed to chair one session but he did not go), Bio security and Infectious Diseases and Biodefense and Strategies. Only one talk out of three happened at the first session. An academician who also trained at NIAID years ago talked about Hepatitis E vaccine when she used HBV and HAV vaccines as examples for successful ID prevention in China. She mentioned that the HEV vaccine that was approved for marketing by the Chinese FDA in 2012 is now in Phase 1 clinical trial in US sponsored by NIAID. The trial began enrollment in May this year at Emory University.

In the biodefense and strategy session, a Japanese scientist talked about an anti-viral drug known as T-705 or Favipiravir (Avigan), an RNA dependent RNA polymerase inhibitor with broad anti-RNA viral activities. The drug has been approved in Japan for influenza. Avigan was tested for its effect against Ebola during the 2014 outbreak. A clinical trial of using Favipiravir to treat severe hospitalized complicated influenza trial is currently going on at China-Japan Friendship Hospital in Beijing. The results are not available at this time but the presenter said "has obtained interesting results". The second talk is by the president of Ditan Hospital, a comprehensive infectious diseases hospital (one of the 9 ARLG sites in China). He talked about the preparedness and response capacity building at the infectious disease hospitals on biosafety challenges. The center theme of the talk was how Ditan hospital, a small infectious disease specialty hospital, grew to a comprehensive hospital aiming to serve the local residents and people with infectious diseases such a HIV, Hepatitis, and HIV-TB coinfection, pregnant women with TB, ect. The hospital is the quarantine sites for people who suspected suffering potential contagious infections (hospital is very close the the Beijing international airport). According to the director the hospital had 34 incidence of health workers exposed to contaminated biospecimens (and during surgery on HIV+ patients), but none became infected because the hospital has the emergency response protocols in place and can deal with the accidents quite rapidly. This hospital also has a bio-specimen repository for infectious diseases, which according to the director, is open to people who want to use the resource for research projects as long as the research projects have been approved by the Human Genetic Resource office (I confirmed with the director afterwards). The last speaker in this session is from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). Dr. Gong Peng, introduced a project called Biosafety Mega-Science, which is supported by the Hubai Province and CAS and another sponsor whose name I did not catch. The headquarter is located in WIV with branches located in Beijing (Institute of Microbiology, and China CDC) focusing on ID prevention and control. Shanghai branch is located in the Institute of Pasteur Shanghai and will focus on vaccines, and Kunming branch is located in the Institute of Zoology responsible for NHP model development for IDs. This biosafety infrastructure Formation includes biosafety big data, biosafety resources and culture collaboration, biosafety animal models, biosafety laboratory cluster, synthetic biology, biosafety translational medicine . The scientific and technological layout include transmission, pathogenesis, detection, control, surveillance. The biosafety Mega-science project is to conduct innovative research on prevention and control of infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. Learned that WIV and UTMB has signed a MOU on ID basic research, diagnostics and vaccine R&D, and personal training and talent cultivation (both institutions have BSL-4 laboratories). The presenter also mentioned the research on SARS-like coronaviruses found in Chinese bats in caves in Yunnan Province, a project funded by NIAID grant to Ecohealth with its major components on coronaviruses in China.

Worth mentioning was a scientific presentation by a researcher in the Chinese PLA microbiology lab who studied how Zika virus causes microcephaly. His research finds that virus specifically targets the glia progenitor cells, the type of cells that can form glioblastomas. Giving Zika virus to mouse with glioblastoma showed reduction in tumor size. The lab has filed patent on this finding. An NIAID funded researcher from University of Illinois at Chicago talked about his effort to identify anti-Ebola/Marburg virus drugs and found anti-histamine

class of drugs have anti-viral effects. He has several NIAID grants. Seems to be a very successful scientist but had said something he should not have said in a public scientific meeting even was intended as a joke. He strongly disagreed with me and believes that NIH is targeting the Chinese scientists in US universities. A scientist from Global Health Drug Development Institute (GHDDI) funded by BMGF in China presented the institute project on repurposing drugs for Echinococcosis, a parasitic diseases endemic in western China. ReFRAME Library contains about 12,000 compounds built by BMGF and it is free to share.

4. Meeting with GVP/EcoHealth

This morning CDC, ECON, USAID and I met with EcoHealth, who is heading the Global Virome Project (GVP). The head of the EcoHealth is the PI on the NIAID coronavirus grant I mentioned earlier and he is very pleased that the grant just got approved for another 5 years funding. He came to China to attend George Gao's launch of China GVP event, but was canceled at the last min. They suspect it is due to internal political rivalry--some academicians don't like George Gao single handed to lead this project (unofficial). The Predict Project from USAID that funds GVP ends this year. GVP will have to find its funding source. It is talking to different countries for country and regional support. Worry is that China may proceed rapidly on China GVP to exceed US effort, and we will lose the leadership position. DTRA may have interests in GVP and provide funding. I asked the question on what kind of governance over China GVP, no one knows for sure. Without a leadership infrastructure and agreement between GVP and China, the data from individual investigators may not be easily collected and included in the global viral project database.

5. Others--I was acting for (b) (6) for two weeks. Not much but still needed time to approve NIH ECC and FACTS. I am meeting Xiuping tomorrow for an informal meeting. Will ask some questions related to NSFC operations etc informally.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Have a nice week.

Ping

Ping Chen, 陈平 · PhD
Director of NIAID Office in China
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U.S. Embassy Beijing
#55 An Jia Lou Road
Beijing 100600
Office: (b) (6)
Cell: (b) (6)
U.S. Cell: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: 1/4/2020 2:32:30 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)
CC: huzh [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: Re: Re: mysterious pneumonia in Wuhan

Dear Ping,

Please be patient and wait for official announcement.

Best regards,
Zhengli,

[REDACTED] (b) (6)

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E]
Date: 2020-01-04 22:18
To: 石正丽
CC: Hu Zhihong
Subject: Re: mysterious pneumonia in Wuhan
Thank you Zhengli.

For my curiosity would you be able to share the viral agent info? It is OK if not. I completely understand.

Thank you

Best,

Ping

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 4, 2020, at 6:07 AM, 石正丽 <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> wrote:

Dear Ping,

Thank you for your kindness. Yes, this is a virus infection. That'll be fine.

Best regards,

Zhengli,

在2020-01-04 00:05:03, Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)写道:

Dear Zhengli and Zhihong,

Happy New Year!

You are facing a New Year's challenge now. The mysterious pneumonia is happening at your backyard. Wuhan has the best virologists in the world. Confident that you can find out the nature of the illness.

Do you know it is viral for sure?

Many Thanks

Ping from NIAID in Bethesda

From: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=5C55F75B58F14AB2B2CCBAC0A881CCAE- (b) (6)]
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CC: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbedc2d3a003- (b) (6)]; Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6ad94c8f809d41ad91b1f78754f60c54- (b) (6)]; Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=ab30660917b942ffba9ae95d631116f3- (b) (6)]; Lu, Tami (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=683d9f298f344f53b273ce527aa15d9a- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS
Attachments: Projects Funded EEID - updatedMay2019.xlsx

Stephanie Coomes is NIAID's POC for EEID. The EEID grants are being reviewed next week, I believe. Stephanie would have the most recent info for awards, but attached is what has been previously funded by NIH under EEID. This was last updated in May 2019.

Joyelle Kalei Dominique, MS, MBA
Acting Director

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(b) (6)

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From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 3:31 PM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Gray,
See the attachment I prepared previously.
This grant is on bat but can easily expand to other animals too.
Should check to see if FIC/NIAID got any award from the NSF-NSFC initiative on the ecology and evolution of infectious diseases. The participants of the workshop in preparation for this initiative are the top virus chasers in US and China.

From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 3:03 PM

To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Cc: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <joyelle.dom[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Thanks! Do you recall who the US and Chinese PIs are on that coronavirus vector/reservoir grant are?

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 2:42 PM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Cc: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <joyelle.dominique@nih.gov>; Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Gray,

I did. Matt had given OGA the contacts for NSFC. Neither Matt nor I provided contact for CAS.

I suggested that OGA can ask NSFC for contact in CAS.

In 2018, NSF and NSFC had a joint initiative on Ecology and Evolution of infectious diseases. A workshop was held prior to the initiative (NIH is one of the participants to this initiative. Many participants of the workshop are from CAS institute including WIV scientists.

NIAID grant to EcoHealth is studying coronaviruses in animals including bats. The grant has different countries as collaborators in addition to China.

Ping

From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 2:31 PM
To: Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Cc: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: RE: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Did anyone respond to OGA?

From: Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 1:58 AM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Cc: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: Re: POCs for NSFC and CAS

I have not heard about this call

On Feb 6, 2020, at 11:55 PM, Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> wrote:

This is first I have heard of this planned telcon.

We should give them the contact number they seek. Not sure we have good contact for CAS as we mostly work with CAMS, but I expect that you, Ping, have contacts for all.

Hilary, have you heard about this telcon that OS and OGA seem to be planning even before the WHO meeting is convened?

We will see the Chinese tomorrow so this may be brought up by Han Koo if she participates.

Gray

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Thursday, February 6, 2020 6:33 PM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Cc: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: Fwd: POCs for NSFC and CAS

FYI

Do we know about the telecon?
I haven't responded

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Koo, Han (OS/OGA) (CTR)" <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Date: February 6, 2020 at 6:14:15 PM EST
To: "Brown, Matthew (NIH/NCI) [E]" <[REDACTED] (b) (6)> "Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E]" <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: POCs for NSFC and CAS

Hi Matt and Ping,

We need POCs of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) and The Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) ASAP. Can you assist?

We are planning to coordinate a teleconference (likely [Feb 17](#)) among different partners for a larger discussion on funding basic research for the animal reservoir and evolutionary biology of nCoV based off of the WHO meeting on nCoV on the 11 and 12.

Please let me know by COB today if possible. Thank you so much.

Best,
Han

Sent from my iPhone

REL0000484896

From: Hu Zhihong [(b) (6)]
Sent: 2/11/2020 4:01:30 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]
CC: (b) (6)
Subject: Re: Hello from NIAID

Dear Ping,

Thank you very much for your kind words. I totally agree that the more we understand the virus, the better chance we have to control the disease.

Take care.

Zhihong

--

Zhihong Hu, Dr., Prof. Wuhan Institute of Virology Chinese Academy of Sciences Wuhan 430071, P.R. China
Tel/fax; (b) (6) email: (b) (6)

-----原始邮件-----

发件人: "Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E]" < (b) (6) >
发送时间: 2020-02-11 06:34:44 (星期二)
收件人: " (b) (6) " < (b) (6) > " (b) (6) " < (b) (6) >
抄送:
主题: Hello from NIAID

Dear Zhengli and Zhihong,

I just want to drop a note to both of you that I think of you daily and others who work so hard to fight this new virus. The ground work on the understanding of coronaviruses you have built through years of research has contributed to the understanding of this new virus.

I pray for your safety and best wishes for China to conquer the new virus.

Best,

Ping

Ping Chen, PhD

International Health Specialist

Office of Global Research

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

National Institutes of Health

Office 1E61A, 5601 Fishers Lane

Rockville, MD 20852

(b) (6)

Office: (b) (6)

Mobile: (b) (6)

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEF44552B2918975F5001D13- (b) (6)]
Sent: 1/22/2020 11:04:07 PM
To: Western, Karl (NIH/NIAID) [V] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=8c331867fb0c45e1b3586064eb269422- (b) (6); Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=1ceb55d4b673477391c9da8a3eb3c75c- (b) (6) Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=5c55f75b58f14ab2b2ccbac0a881ccae- (b) (6); Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)]
CC: Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6ad94c8f809d41ad91b1f78754f60c54- (b) (6) NIAID OGR PPC [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=2e17fe8e2b6d464fb360ddf6be29487b- (b) (6)]
Subject: Re: Collecting info on N CoV

Thanks Dr. Western.

Eco-health has NIAID grant which has collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS, studying the coronaviruses in wild animals, focusing on bats, in China. One of the key Chinese collaborators is Dr. Zhengli Shi, who works on coronaviruses. I am sure she is at the front line of the current outbreak in China.

In my personal opinion, it would be very difficult to get any biological samples out of China. I think Erik already contacted Peter Daszak, who is the PI on the NIAID grant to reach out the Chinese collaborators. I contacted Dr. Shi directly before we even knew it was coronavirus. She did not share the viral information (I know she knew it already).

The Chinese government is in charge of the information now. I don't think any scientists would want to share anything with us if it is not already in the public domain. (b) (6) sent me the news below. The government even banned the most respected academician, Dr. Nanshan Zhong, to speak out.

- **Prominent Pulmonologist Reportedly Banned From Giving Interviews:** A Hong Kong journalist (@roseluqui) tweeted that Dr. Zhong Nanshan, a prominent pulmonologist who discovered the SARS coronavirus in 2003, has been banned from giving further interviews on the novel coronavirus outbreak. Dr. Zhong, based in Guangzhou, is considered a credible source on infectious disease by many Guangzhou residents because of his research and criticism of government actions in the wake of the SARS epidemic.

The U.S. CDC had just ended its EID program with the China CDC. So we no longer have someone from inside of the China CDC to get more information. I bet George Gao would not respond to Dr. Barney Graham soon.

I think getting virus isolate and other patient biologics can be possible from Hong Kong, Taiwan or Japan (during the NIAID-Japan meeting in Thailand) and Thailand (NIAID will be there for the NIAID-Japan meeting). There will be more cases showing up in the neighboring countries to China. If WHO steps in and requests China to share the data and samples with the world, it may work (Avian Influenza example). But that can take a very long time.

We can certainly contact researchers for future collaborations but we need to know what we can offer to them as well.

Just my thoughts

Ping

From: "Western, Karl (NIH/NIAID) [V]" <(b) (6)>
Date: Wednesday, January 22, 2020 at 5:17 PM
To: "Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E]" <(b) (6)> "Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E]" <(b) (6)> "Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E]" <(b) (6)> "Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E]" <chenpi@niaid.nih.gov>
Cc: "Western, Karl (NIH/NIAID) [V]" <(b) (6)> William Rosa <(b) (6)> NIAID OGR PPC <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: Collecting info on N CoV

I will be out most of tomorrow with medical appointments, but might be able to call in if you want me included.

Independently, I recommend review of recent scientific publications summarized in my international annual report and available on End Notes.

Two recent examples involving CAS Institute of Virology and BSL-4 facility include:

- University of Minnesota and CAS Institute of Virology review of the origin and evolution of pathogenic coronaviruses in *Nature Reviews: Microbiology*. Minnesota had a CEIRS award for one funding cycle.
- Columbia University School of Public Health, Eco-Health Alliance and CAS Institute of Virology published a few days ago on the results of surveillance of human animal interactions and bat coronavirus spillover potential in rural southern China. Columbia is a current CETR holder.

Karl A. Western, MD, DTPH
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National Institutes of Health
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From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2020 5:00 PM
To: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> NIAID OGR PPC <(b) (6)>
Subject: Collecting info on N CoV

We need to quickly put our heads together and study grants to compile contacts we might reach out to so we can explore potential for collaboration on the new CoV. We are hoping it can involve sample sharing but more in general we need a list of contacts and need to explore what labs are doing what, as far as we can tell. Can we discuss and start this process tomorrow? Thanks. Gray

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEEF44552B2918975F5001D13- (b) (6)]
Sent: 7/29/2019 10:17:51 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]
Subject: notes
Attachments: summary_07252019 trans NIH call.docx; R&B Liver Cancer and ID summit_summary.docx

It was a short meeting. As the outline laid out, Matt went over first the actions table he created to track the activities for each IC and individuals.

For NIH-NSFC JWG meeting, Gray asked about the schedule, which as then briefly discussed. One event is the informal sightseeing with NSFC staff, which Matt suggested to NSFC. When he first discussed with me, I told him my concern. I don't want NSFC feels that they need to do this and would have to plan and may even offer to cover the cost. Another concern I have is informal conversation may sometimes be misunderstood. Anyway, I may be over reacting. Matt said he does this type of events and always good to spend informal time with the counterparts. I do agree with the idea but we are in a very special time period.

George Gao will host a welcome dinner on the evening of the 26.

Two embassy events are proposed by Matt, one is the limited country team meeting and another one is to jointly hold an event at Beijing American Center to let the public know about US-China collaboration in biomedical research. If NSFC can join, that would be a nice event to have. I asked if Matt has contacted the front desk to schedule the limited country team meeting, he has not. It is a good approach to have different sections in the embassy to learn what NIH is doing in China and for NIH people to learn about the Mission.

Last, Matt mentioned MOUs. He described the requirements for having any MOUs or any kind of agreements with Chinese partners that each IC plans to have with China will need to go through the review process including the development of Benefits and Risk statement. He mentioned NIAID's Henan MOU, the first one went through the process and it is approved now. He offered support for ICs who need.

Gray can fill in if I missed any point. It was short call and not a lot of questions.

R&B Liver Cancer and Infectious Diseases summit

Biosecurity and Biosafety

China has raised biosecurity to the national level. Call for the establishment of national and across B&R platform for ID diagnosis, surveillance, and infection control, as well as information networks. Of course, China-lead B@R infrastructure (mentioned Mekong River project for training?)

Hepatitis vaccines as example for successful prevention of hepatitis infections among B&R countries.

Japan presented Avigan, also known as Favipiravir, an RNA dependent RNA polymerase inhibitor with broad anti-viral activities, influenza, ebola etc. Not approved for uncomplicated influenza. Collaboration with China-Japan Friendship Hospital using Avigan to treat severe hospitalized complicated influenza cases have obtain interesting results (can talk to Cao Bin for more information).

The director of Beijing Ditan hospital used his hospital as an example to demonstrate hospital development from a specialized hospital for infectious diseases only to a comprehensive hospital centered on providing needed services to the infectious patients and local residents. The hospital is also the center for the emergency response due to infectious diseases. It provides training, field work, and organize infectious disease special networks. The hospital is the assigned hospital for HIV. It provides 24 hours HIV post exposure preventive consultation and response, and surgery service to HIV-infected patients. Prevention of maternal-infant transfer for HBV (100%), syphilis (96%), and HIV (95%). Vaccination for HBV (2500) and Rabie (4000). The hospital has comprehensive protocols to deal with occupational accidental exposure to infectious materials. Has had 34 cases but none was found infected with HIV due to immediate response and adequate procedures. The hospital has biospecimen repository for various emerging infectious diseases including HIV, HBV, flu, etc. The repository is open for use by other researchers if their research projects are approved by the Human Genetic Resource office.

Ditan has clinical data and biospecimen bioband, key laboratory for new emerging infectious diseases, bioinformatic platform, IRB platform, clinical trial center for drug evaluation, clinical methodology research platform.

Ditan is the appointed AIDS/HIV hospital for treatment, national and Beijing HIV monitoring hospital, WHO YaTai region HIV/ADIS collaborative center, HIV/AIDS diagnosis and treatment research center. Carry out tasks assigned by the government such as provide monitoring and detection service for large conferences and events.

Perform free treatment and outpatient follow up, AIDS inpatient with commodities, comprehensive treatment for AIDS patients.

Routine preparation and emergency response—hospital infection control, timely response and treatment, isolation, drug and protection material supply, evaluation and adjustment response. Development of quality control standards for individual disease, and drafted 2018 national professional clinical service quality management report.

Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS, Gong Peng, introduced the project called Center for Biosafety Mega-Science supported by Hubei Province, CAS, and ???. the headquarter is located in WIV (highly pathogenic viruses), Beijing branch is IM and China CDC (Prevention and Control), Kunming branch is in Kunming Institute of Zoology (NHP) and Shanghai branch is in the Institute of Paeuster Shanghai (vaccines). Biosafety infrastructures Formation includes biosafety big data infrastructure, biosafety resources and culture collaboration infrastructure, biosafety animal model infrastructure, biosafety laboratory cluster, synthetic biology infrastructure, biosafety translational medicine infrastructure. The scientific and technological layout include transmission, pathogenesis, detection, control, surveillance. The biosafety Mega-science project is to conduct innovative research on prevention and control of infectious diseases, biosafety and biosecurity. WIV has many international collaborations—

Sino-French Scientific cooperation. Nov. 2018, kicked off Sino-French Nipah Project.

Cooperation with the U.S. Organizations including China-U.S Workshops on the challenges of emerging infections, laboratory safety and global health security (4 sessions) organized by the Chinese academy of sciences, Chinese academy of agricultural sciences, National Academy of Sciences of the U.S., discovery of a rich gene pool of bat SARS related coronaviruses provides new insights into the origin of SARS coronaviruses (EcoHealth provided partial funding for this project and NIAID funded EcoHealth), cooperative agreement with UTMB (both institutes have BSL-4 labs) on basic research on IDs, R&D on diagnosis techniques and vaccines, and personal training and talent cultivation.

Sino-Pak Exchanges and Cooperation includes scientists from WIV visit international center for chemistry and biological sciences (ICCBS) Pakistan for academic exchanges and bilateral cooperation discussions. WIV and ICCBS of University of Karachi signed MOU for collaboration on prevention and control of emerging IDs along the China-Pakistan economic corridor.

Sino-Africa Joint Research Center—division of microbiology and epidemic disease control of WIV with Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, National Museum of Kenya, Kenya Wildlife Service, and University of Nairobi on Pathogen detection, epidemiology of infectious diseases, prevention and control IDs. Recent progress on this collaboration include the construction of the microbiological laboratory, equipment installation and commissioning, three pathogen surveillance sentinels for Marburg, MERS, ect, more than 2000 samples collected, isolated and detected, produced 5 research papers, talent cultivation (1 PhD, 12 masters and 1 visiting scientist), the Sino-Kenyan Symposium on IDs.

International workshop on biosafety management and techniques organized by the ministry of foreign affairs of China and CAS. The objectives are understanding the international strategies and trends of biosafety, learn the key components of a biorisk management system, acquire knowledge on contagious pathogens and hands-on experience of safe operations in biosafety laboratories, and know basic design principles of biosafety laboratories.

Future perspective: centered on cooperation initiatives are 1) international responses—coordinating mechanisms of response for provision of advice, research support and biosafety capacity, 2) training—developing international competency through training and personnel exchange, 3) institutional cooperation—promoting institutional cooperation and knowledge sharing, 4) Scientific excellence—creating partnerships in scientific collaborations, enhancing diagnostic capabilities and establishing expert advisory groups.

China medicine and health products export and import association (中国医药保健品进出口商会)—presented successful examples of Chinese companies

From: zlshi [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: 2/11/2020 2:02:53 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13 [REDACTED] (b) (6)]; huzh [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: Re: Hello from NIAID

Thanks.

SHI Zhengli, Ph. D
Senior Scientist & Professor
Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
44 Xiao Hong Shan
430071 Wuhan, Hubei
China
Tel & Fax: [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Email: [REDACTED] (b) (6)

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E]
Date: 2020-02-11 06:34
To: [REDACTED] (b) (6); [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: Hello from NIAID
Dear Zhengli and Zhihong,

I just want to drop a note to both of you that I think of you daily and others who work so hard to fight this new virus. The ground work on the understanding of coronaviruses you have built through years of research has contributed to the understanding of this new virus.

I pray for your safety and best wishes for China to conquer the new virus.

Best,

Ping

Ping Chen, PhD
International Health Specialist
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Rockville, MD 20852
[REDACTED] (b) (6)
Office: [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Mobile: [REDACTED] (b) (6)

From: Schiltz, Helen (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=CC71A2373F5B450A8AD2CECFAAF41A57 (b) (6)]
Sent: 3/30/2020 6:32:14 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]; Sciotti, Rick (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=afc7c6959cb44a0aa7de771f2ebb4871- (b) (6)]; Sheoran, Anita (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=29dc41f95e0d4bddac94798fa21ec76d (b) (6)]; Ostrye, Carol (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=4d630f0f032b42589c2172e3f7f82271 (b) (6)]; Eakin, Ann (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=7dafba298c194f9d9bc13c54fe0cf29a- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: Meeting to discuss EIDD2801
Attachments: IB Ed 05 21FEB2020.pdf

Ping and the team,

Here is a copy of the remdesivir IB (Feb 2020) version (confidential) for your reference as the benchmark for toxicology comparison.

Helen F. Schiltz, MS, PhD

Program Officer, Drug Development Section
Office of Biodefense, Research Resources and Translational Research (OBRRTTR)
DMID, NIAID, NIH, DHHS
5601 Fishers Lane Room 8G38
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From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 1:28 PM
To: Sciotti, Rick (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Sheoran, Anita (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Schiltz, Helen (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Ostrye, Carol (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Eakin, Ann (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: Meeting to discuss EIDD2801
Importance: High

Hi,

I would like to schedule a call with only DDS+Carol and Ann to discuss Ann's suggestion of having Emory to provide a comparison of tox profiles of drugs in the same class as EIDD2801, particularly to remdesivir. The purpose of the comparison is to help people who do NOT understand completely the full picture of the toxicity observed for EIDD2801/EIDD1931 in animal studies.

I went into calendar to schedule the meeting. For any time I selected you are all not available (showing red except Ann). So I am sending out this message asking you if you let me know if you are available for the following time and date

Tuesday, 3/31: 8-9 (can be shortened to 8:30 or 8:45)

Any other time you are available on Tuesday

Wednesday, April 1: 8-9 again

Any other time you are available on Wednesday.

Since I have not scheduled a meeting after I returned from China, I would like to know where and how to get the Skype meeting and calling information distributed in the meeting invite notice.

Thank you

Ping
Ping Chen PhD
Program Officer
Drug Development Section
Office of Biodefense Research Resources and Translational Research
Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
National Institutes of Health
5601 Fishers Lane, 8G37
Rockville, MD 20852

(b) (6)

Office: (b) (6)

Mobile: (b) (6)

From: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=585133D3FA194F06AA618678B2817C22- (b) (6)]
Sent: 1/7/2020 4:03:59 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

I don't have one, myself, but I'll see if I can find out.

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:01 AM
To: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

Erik,
Do you know where can I get a copy of the agenda for the bunya virus meeting?
Thanks
Ping

From: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:41 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

Thanks Ping! I think I forgot that you were back in Fishers lane. Welcome back!

Thanks for the info. I will let them know that George will be here next week. Do you know if there is a replacement for you in the embassy in Beijing? If so I'd love to connect with them.

Erik

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:38 AM
To: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Wuhan Pneumonia

Hi Erik,

Happy New Year!

Do you know that I am back at OGR now? My 6 years in Beijing ended three weeks ago and had to come back.

Yes, I have been following the news. Here is what I know so far, not much though. I contacted Dr. Zhengli Shi at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (she is your grantee) and she confirmed that it is viral infection. But she won't tell me the nature of the virus. She told me to be patient and wait for the public accouchement. My friend in the US embassy in Beijing told me last night that there will be a cable coming out soon on this matter. Once I have the cable I will send to you. But I don't expect it has much scientific information in it.

REL0000484928

Speaking of George Gao, he will be at Fishers Lane attending the bunya virus conference next Monday and Tuesday. I am sure he will have the most recent information on the virus. If Barney and Vincent are at the meeting, they can talk to him directly.

Ping

From: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:53 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: Wuhan Pneumonia

Hi Ping,
Happy New Year! I'm sure you've been following the news of the viral pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan. I was wondering if you have any information to share beyond what's already been reported in the news? And also whether you have any contacts with anyone that may have sequenced the virus, maybe someone with George Gao's group? I've been working to put together what we know so far and have been reaching out to my investigators as well. Barney Graham and Vincent Munster were particularly interested in the sequenced virus.

Thanks for your help!
Erik


Erik J. Stemmy, Ph.D.
Program Officer
Respiratory Diseases Branch
Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases NIAID/NIH/HHS
5601 Fishers Lane, Room 8E18
Bethesda, MD 20892-9825
Phone: (b) (6)
Email: (b) (6)

Getting ready to publish? Share the good news with your program officer asap! NIAID may be able to help publicize your article. And, remember to list your NIAID grant or contract number in the publication.

NOTE: This material is intended for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. It may contain privileged, confidential information that is protected from disclosure under applicable laws. If you are not the addressee, or a person authorized to deliver the document to the addressee, please note that you are strictly prohibited from reviewing, copying, disclosing, disseminating or distributing this material or any other action based on the contents of this material. If you have received this communication in error, please permanently delete this from your system immediately. Thank you.

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=E86E86EEEEF44552B2918975F5001D13- (b) (6)]
Sent: 12/11/2019 7:52:09 AM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]
Subject: Transfer 8-PMAP
Attachments: Self Evaluation_2014.docx; Self Evaluation_2015.docx; Self Evaluation_2017.docx; 2017 end of year_PMAP.pdf; 2018 accomplishment.docx; Ping Chen Sucession Plan 2018_PC.doc; PMAP 2014_2015 For your records001.pdf

Ping Chen, 陈平 · PhD
Director of NIAID Office in China
Office of Global Research, NIAID, NIH
U.S. Embassy Beijing
#55 An Jia Lou Road
Beijing 100600
Office: (b) (6)
Cell: (b) (6)
U.S. Cell: + (b) (6)
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(b) (6)



Self Evaluation: Ping Chen

Major accomplishment in 2015

(b) (6)



Summary of 2017 accomplishment

Ping Chen

(b) (6)





EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017


(b) (6)



EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017

(b) (6)



EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017



(b) (6)

EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017


(b) (6)



EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017

(b) (6)



EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017

(b) (6)



EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017



(b) (6)

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Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017

(b) (6)



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Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017



(b) (6)

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Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017

(b) (6)



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Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017

(b) (6)

EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017




(b) (6)

EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017


(b) (6)



EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017


(b) (6)



EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)
Chen Ping

Appraisal Period
From: 01/01/2017 To: 12/31/2017

(b) (6)





Summary of 2018 work accomplishments-- Ping Chen

(b) (6)



NIAID Staff Transition Plan

Ensuring Continuity During Transitions

The NIAID Succession & Transition Planning Program

Prepared by
The Office of Workforce Effectiveness and Resources (OWER)

NIAID

What is Transition Planning?

Transition planning is a systematic process that ensures the continuity of the Institute’s mission and scientific direction by developing a plan of action to transition work when a vacancy is anticipated or realized. This **Staff Transition Plan** will help your Division/Office ensure continuity of your position’s responsibilities in the event of a vacancy or unplanned transition. The purpose of this document is to collect information about your position, the duties that you regularly perform, and the professional network you maintain. While a Staff Transition Plan is recommended for *all* NIAID positions, as anyone in any position can use this plan to assist with preparing for a seamless transition, it is particularly important that Key Position incumbents have a Staff Transition Plan and designated backup(s) in case of a vacancy or unexpected departure. All duties and responsibilities will be reassigned to the designated backup(s) unless otherwise reassigned in the tables below.

The Staff Transition Plan is divided into the following sections:

- A) Position Overview
- B) Transition Strategy
- C) Professional Network Overview
- D) Critical Actions for Next Steps
- E) Supervisor Section

What are the Benefits of Transition Planning?

- Seamless staff transitions
- On-demand access to legacy knowledge
- Identification and development of talent capable of filling relevant openings created by departing employees

STAFF TRANSITION PLAN

A. Position Overview



(b) (6)

B. Transition Strategy

1. What are the core functions performed in your organizational unit?

Initiate, organize, facilitate, coordinate, promote, and provide support to international collaborations and events for NIAID intramural and extramural biomedical research programs with our global partners in the areas of infectious diseases and immunology.

2. What are the Key Duties and Activities performed by this position (e.g., Major Outputs, Key Decisions, Tasks Managed, Resources Managed), Standard Requests, Special Projects/Ad Hoc Requests, and Meeting/Committee Membership commitments that will require coverage?

In the table below, document the responsibilities of your position and identify corresponding backups in the event that you leave your position. Reference your position description, PMAP, and browse MS Outlook to effectively capture the critical responsibilities and activities you perform. Insert additional rows as necessary.

- **Areas of Responsibility:** what is the task/activity/project (e.g., budgetary planning, annual reporting)?
- **Work Product and System/Tools Used to Perform Work:** what is the format of the final work product (e.g., article, report, briefing) and do you use any special computer programs or other tools (other than Microsoft Office)?
- **Customer/End User:** who receives or makes use of the work product (e.g., NIAID leadership team, NIH stakeholders, Congress)?
- **Stakeholders to Consider:** who are the important stakeholders who should be considered?
- **Timeframe:** what time of year or how often do you complete this task (e.g., monthly, every June, bi-annually)?
- **Percent of your time:** what percent of your time do you spend on the task during the time of year you work on it?
- **If not going to a designated/selected backup, reassign to:** who would complete this task/activity/project in your absence? In addition to a) transitioning activities to one designated backup (i.e., a staff member designated to 'act' in the vacant position while it is being advertised and filled) or b) sharing duties across multiple backups, consider the following strategies: c) seek temporary contract support to cover position responsibilities that are not inherently governmental, or d) defer any non-critical work until the position is filled with a new incumbent.

Key Duties and Activities performed (e.g., Major Outputs, Key Decisions, Tasks Managed, Resources Managed) that will require coverage

	Areas of Responsibility	Work Product and System/Tools Used to Perform Work	Customer/End User	Critical Stakeholders (e.g., strategic partners and collaborators)	Timeframe	Percent of Time	If not reassigned to your Designated Backup, Reassign to:
Ex.	Prepare Congressional Workforce Justification Report	Annual written report – data retrieved from EDie system	Institute Director	Congress	Every December	50% time Oct-Dec	Jane Doe (Deputy Director)
A.	Participate in monitoring NIAID funded activities in China	Regular teleconferences, site visits, communications via emails and telephone calls	Chinese PIs, NIAID program staff, OGR staff	OGR, Chinese PIs, NIAID program staff	All year round	30%	Gayle Bernabe (OGR regional officer for China) James Meegan (director of OGR)
B.	Consultation and advising on both US and China fundings, policies and regulations	Provided on the needed basis; web based information systems in English and Chinese	Chinese researchers, NIAID researchers and program staff,	US and Chinese collaborators, researchers, and program staff, leadership	Any time	10%	Gayle Bernabe (OGR regional officer for China) James Meegan (director of OGR)

Commented [DJ](3): Most of the plans distributed percentage of time across all the sections of the plan. Ping has each section equally 100%. The instructions were not clear, so either would be acceptable, but just to note the discrepancy from the others.

Commented [CP](4): I don't think I spend 30% my time monitoring NIAID funding activities in China. The grants are managed by the project officers. I spent time to establish an activity such as AMR trial in China. Once it's established I have the program staff to provide oversight. Only be involved when my assistance is needed.

			leadership, others who are interested in biomedical research in China and in US (for the Chinese researchers)				Note: there will be no back up to provide consultation and advice on China funding, policy and regulation.
C.	Research on specific topics such as emerging infectious diseases, antimicrobial resistance in China; Learn regulations on clinical trials and biomedical product approval processes; Other information that is important for planning and facilitating US-China collaborations in ID	Daily activities. Will require the ability to read and write in Chinese and understand content written in Chinese	US researchers, policy makers, biopharma and biotech	US researchers, policy makers, biopharma and biotech	Any time	30%	
D.	Plan, initiate, organize programs, activities, or events on shared interests in a given research topic with Chinese partners; Prepare and facilitate congressional and other leadership visits	When needed; email and internet, basic electronic tools	Researchers in both countries	Researchers and government and other funding agencies in both countries	Any time	14%	Gayle Bernabe (OGR regional officer for China) James Meegan (director of OGR)
E.	Provide support for service request such as US visa, business trip, meeting planning for US visitors, prepare briefings on NIAID activities in China	When requested; basic electronic tools; need to have clearance and training in order to request for expedite US-VISA	Chinese researchers and officials who plan to visit US on NIAID related business; NIH/NIAID personnel visit to China	Strategic partners, researchers, NIH staff	Any time	5%	No one
F.	Weekly communication with OGR in written update and teleconference	weekly	OGR and self	OGR staff	Mondays	10%	No one
G.	Budget, administrative responsibilities	Quarterly account reports	OGR	OGR		1%	William Rosa (OGR budget officer)

Commented [CP(5)]: Learn?

Commented [CP(6)]: I've spent more time when organizing events such as NIH-CAMS annual meeting.

Commented [CP(7)]: Suggest to include* attend regular country team meetings in the embassy, HHS agencies' weekly meetings, Embassy health group bi-weekly meetings, and other health relevant events organized by the embassy and by other HHS agencies*. Would take about 10% time.

Standard Requests for Support

	Areas of Responsibility	Work Product and System/Tools Used to Perform Work	Customer/End User	Critical Stakeholders (e.g., strategic partners and collaborators)	Timeframe	Percent of Your Time	If not reassigned to your Designated Backup, Reassign to:
A.	Requests for Information on China's research, health policies, biomedical regulations etc	Summaries, reports, cables Basic electronic tools and internet, Require understand Chinese	NIAID, NIH, Researchers and biomedical industries or whoever needed the information	NIAID, NIH, any collaborators, researchers	Any time	50%	None
B.	Requests for information on US fundings, collaborations, etc	Emails, referrals, weblinks, arrange meetings and discussions	Chinese researchers and biomedical funding and	Collaborators, potential collaborators, Chinese researchers	Any time	50%	Gayle Bernabe (OGR regional officer for China) James Meegan (director of OGR)

			research organizations				
C.							

Special Project Assignments/Ad Hoc Requests for Support

	Areas of Responsibility	Work Product and System/Tools Used to Perform Work	Customer/End User	Critical Stakeholders (e.g., strategic partners and collaborators)	Timeframe	Percent of Your Time	If not reassigned to your Designated Backup, Reassign to:
A.	Request for expedite VISA	Submit expedite US VISA requests to US consulate; Training for submitting expedite visa request	Chinese researchers and partners	Strategic partners and collaborators	Any time (30 min preparation for expedite request)	1%	None
B.	Request for attending meetings, presentations	Summaries for meetings attended in weekly reports, presentations; PowerPoint, and basic electronic tools	OGR, Meeting audience	OGR, NIAID, NIH, Chinese partners and researchers	Any time	15%	Gayle Bernabe (OGR regional officer for China) James Meegan (director of OGR)
C.	Request for trip planning and coordinating, preparing for briefings	Briefing documents or trip schedules; NIAID grant data base, basic IT tools	OGR, other officials, researchers	OGR, NIAID, other health care partners and Chinese partners	Any time	10%	Gayle Bernabe (OGR regional officer for China) James Meegan (director of OGR)

Key Meetings/Committees/Work Groups Attended

	Name of Meeting/Committee/Work Group	Objective(s) of Meeting/Committee/Work Group	Incumbent's Role	Meeting Schedule	If not reassigned to your Designated Backup, Reassign to:
A.	NIH-China MOST clinical and translational collaboration meeting	Partnership in Clinical and translational research between NIH and Chinese government and researchers	facilitator	Ad hoc	Gayle Bernabe (OGR regional officer for China) James Meegan (director of OGR)
B.	ICAAC annual meeting	The world largest antimicrobial meeting. The meeting addresses new advancement in research and product development for antimicrobials and other related topics and the problems facing the world in infectious diseases.	participant	Annually in US	Any one who is interested in
C.	Weekly telecon with OGR	Provide update and seek advice	Main contributor	weekly	No one
D.	China TB Clinical Trial Consortium (CTCTC) project working group	Update on CTCTC activities	Participant and consultant	Bi-weekly	Gayle Bernabe (OGR regional officer for China)
E.	CDC annual oversight meeting (invited by CDC China Office)	Unknown at present	Outside partner/collaborator/?	annual	No one

Commented [CP(8)]: We are doing bi-weekly now

Commented [CP(9)]: Due to the change of contractors and other personnel changes the teleconference had stopped (at least I was not on the participant list). Have no idea what happened. The DAIDS support to CTCTC ends this year and don't know if it would continue.

Commented [CP(10)]: HHS agency representatives are on the committee to provide review and comments on US CDC projects in China. Most time I was the only person outside CDC with technical background.

Commented [CP(11)]: Inter HHS partner and Consultant

C. Professional Network Overview

1. Key Customers: *Please list those individuals that you serve on a regular basis.*

Name and Title	Office	Nature of Relationship/Notes
Gray Handley	Office of Director, NIAID	Advisor on International affairs in health
James Meegan	OGR, NIAID	supervisor
Gayle Bernabe	OGR, NIAID	Regional program officer for China
William Rosa	OGR	Administrative issues and budget

2. Direct Reports: *Please list the individuals that you directly supervise/manage.*

Name and Title	Office	Nature of Relationship/Notes
None		

3. Knowledge Sharing Network: *Please list those individuals in your knowledge sharing network (internal or external to NIAID, other institutes, etc.)*

Name and Title	Office	Nature of Relationship/Notes
Ken Earhart	HHS office in China	Health Attache
Ron Molenaar	US CDC office in China	Country director
Gong Wang	US FDA office in China	Assistant Country director
Names listed in Key customers	OGR, NIAID	NIH

Commented [CP12]: All these people are gone. Please realize the overseas assignments are not permanent. I would suggest to put
 HHS Health Attache
 CDC Country director in China
 FDA Country director in China
 ESTH Section Beijing embassy
 Other agencies with health interests in Beijing embassy

D. Critical Actions for Next Steps

1. Submit your completed Staff Transition Plan to your supervisor for review and validation and attach any corresponding documents as appropriate.
2. Once approved by your supervisor, update your Staff Transition Plan on an annual basis (i.e., in conjunction with PMAP establishment), and/or as your roles or responsibilities change.
3. Talk to your supervisor about whether you should complete a [Transition Planning Interview](#).
4. Once the backup(s) or successor is identified, your supervisor may ask you to meet with the selected backup(s) or successor to ensure that he/she is adequately prepared, cross-trained, and supported to perform the roles described in this Staff Transition Plan. If this is the case, [Job Aids](#) are available on the [NIAID Succession Planning intranet site](#) to facilitate this meeting.
5. Does your Division/Office have **competencies** established for your position/function? If no, please visit the NIAID competency intranet site and contact the OWER Competency Management Team at NIAIDOWERCMWG@niaid.nih.gov if you need additional assistance defining the competencies essential to success in your position.



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN

(b) (6)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN (continued)

EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)



(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)



(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2014

To:

12/31/2014

(b) (6)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN (continued)

EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, First, MI)

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2014

To:
12/31/2014

(b) (6)

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN

EMPLOYEE'S NAME (*Last, First, MI*)
Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD
From: 1/1/2015 To: 12/31/2015

(b) (6)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

REL0000484930.0007

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

REL0000484930.0007

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)



HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)

Description:

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

REL0000484930.0007

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)



(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)



HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:
1/1/2015

To:
12/31/2015



(b) (6)

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)

(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

REL0000484930.0007

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)



(Summary Rating Elements, continued)

HHS EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE PLAN *(continued)*

EMPLOYEE'S NAME *(Last, First, MI)*

Chen, Ping

APPRAISAL PERIOD

From:

1/1/2015

To:

12/31/2015

(b) (6)

From: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=585133D3FA194F06AA618678B2817C22- (b) (6)]
Sent: 1/9/2020 2:22:42 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)] Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=1ceb55d4b673477391c9da8a3eb3c75c- (b) (6)]; Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: WSJ article

Thanks Ping! I spoke with Peter yesterday afternoon. He says he doesn't have any new information to share, and that his collaborators at Wuhan haven't been sharing any details since Christmas. He did say that the original rumors of a novel coronavirus came from a commercial lab that was used to do initial sequencing leaked the information.

We have also found this article from CCTV that says they have the whole genome sequenced. <http://m.news.cctv.com/2020/01/09/ARTI9Vp9Lra4Tvtz3r7es96200109.shtml>

Peter has said he'll let me know if he hears anything else.

Erik

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Thursday, January 9, 2020 9:15 AM
To: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: FW: WSJ article

If you haven't seen this WSJ article on the outbreak of the pneumonia in China, here it is.

Erik,
Have you talked to Peter Daszak? His grant funds the coronavirus research in China. Dr. Shi Zhengli in WIV is the expert on coronaviruses. Her work on the coronaviruses in bats in China may allow the quick identification of the virus causing the pneumonia outbreak, assuming WSJ report is correct on the strain of coronaviruses is the culprits.
Ping

From: Nordlund, Kristen (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) <(b) (6)>
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 11:16 AM
To: Cone, George Edward (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) <(b) (6)>
Subject: WSJ article

All – below the WSJ article that has been going around this morning. Please note that the source is just someone familiar with the investigation and not at this point substantiated.

New Virus Discovered by Chinese Scientists Investigating Pneumonia Outbreak

Latest tally of people sickened in Wuhan is 59, with seven in a critical condition



Public-health officials in Bangkok hand out disease-monitoring information after performing thermal scans on passengers arriving from Wuhan, China, on Wednesday. PHOTO: LAUREN DECICCA/GETTY IMAGES

By

Natasha Khan

Updated Jan. 8, 2020 8:04 am ET

- SAVE
- PRINT
- TEXT

HONG KONG—Chinese scientists investigating a mystery illness that has sickened dozens in central China have discovered a new strain of coronavirus, a development that will test the country's upgraded capabilities for dealing with unfamiliar infectious diseases.

The novel coronavirus was genetically sequenced from a sample from one patient and subsequently found in some of the others affected in the city of Wuhan, according to people familiar with the findings. Chinese authorities haven't concluded that the strain is the underlying cause of sickness in all the patients who have been isolated in Wuhan since the infection first broke out in early December, the people said.

There are many known coronaviruses—some can cause ailments like common colds in humans, while others don't affect humans at all. Some—such as severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, in 2003—have led to deadly outbreaks, lending urgency to efforts to contain the current situation.

The number of reported cases of viral pneumonia in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, was 59 on Sunday, rising from 27 on Dec. 31, according to Wuhan's Municipal Health Commission, with seven people in a critical condition. No deaths have been reported.

The disease afflicting patients in Wuhan hasn't been transmitted from human to human, and health-care workers have remained uninfected, according to city health officials as of Jan. 5, suggesting that what is sickening them is for now less virulent than SARS. Those ill in Wuhan are believed to have become sick through exposure to animals linked to a live seafood and animal market.

Health experts say one risk is that the disease could become a bigger threat as tens of millions of Chinese travel around the country during the Lunar New Year holidays that begin in just over two weeks.

Health authorities in Singapore and Hong Kong, cities that have direct flights from Wuhan, have issued alerts and quarantined patients travelling from the region who show signs of fever or breathing difficulties.

In Hong Kong on Tuesday, the government said it was taking precautions against a “severe respiratory disease associated with a novel infectious agent” that it is seeking to make a statutory notifiable infectious disease, meaning doctors would need to report any suspected cases, and patients evading quarantine could be fined or jailed.



A visitor walked past a large photo depicting the 2003 SARS epidemic at an exhibition, '40 Years Through the Lens,' at the National Museum of China, in Beijing, September 2018. PHOTO: WU HONG/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

The Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention is expected to make an announcement of its findings in the coming days, a person familiar with the matter said. The CDC couldn't be reached for comment late Tuesday.

China was criticized for initially covering up SARS, which was first detected in late 2002 but was disclosed only after it began spreading widely, eventually killing 774 people globally, according to the World Health Organization. Beijing overhauled the nation's disease control after reviews found that initial failures to contain and isolate patients with SARS allowed it to proliferate across densely populated Southern China.

The Wuhan outbreak will test how much has changed.

"We learned a bitter lesson in 2003, and we do not want that to happen again," said Alex Lam, chairman of advocacy group Hong Kong Patients' Voices. "China should immediately release their findings so doctors across the world can better know how to tackle this illness."

Hong Kong's department of health, citing information from China's National Health Commission, said the cause of the cluster of pneumonia cases detected in Wuhan was still under investigation, but other known respiratory pathogens had been ruled out.

The main clinical symptoms of those affected by the Wuhan outbreak are fever—with a few patients having difficulty breathing—and invasive lesions of both lungs, which show up on chest radiographs, the WHO said Sunday.



A mourner wearing a mask to ward off SARS under an umbrella during the funeral of a SARS doctor in Hong Kong in 2003. PHOTO: BOBBY YIP/REUTERS

It is unclear what the underlying source of the disease is, though the reported link to a wholesale fish and live animal market could indicate an exposure link to animals, the WHO said. Bats, for example, are known “reservoirs” for coronaviruses, and have been found to transmit the disease to humans through a third vector such as a civet cat, as scientists found in the case of SARS.

The pattern of the unexplained pneumonia cases linked to the market selling seafood and also live game strongly suggests that this is a novel microbe jumping from animal to human, said K.Y. Yuen, Chair Professor of Infectious Diseases at the University of Hong Kong’s Faculty of Medicine.

Researchers have determined that a large proportion of new infectious diseases in humans are transmitted via animals. Such illnesses are referred to as zoonoses. Two newer human coronaviruses, MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV, have been known to cause severe illness and death, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control.

The Wuhan strain is similar to bat coronaviruses that were a precursor to SARS, according to a person familiar with the new findings.

Given the marked advances in hospital isolation facilities, infection-control training and laboratory diagnostic capabilities in the past two decades, it is unlikely that this outbreak will lead to a major 2003-like epidemic, Mr. Yuen said.

In Wuhan, which has China's first Biosafety Level 4 laboratory—a specialized research laboratory that deals with potentially deadly infectious agents like Ebola—the market at the center of investigations has been shut down since Jan 1.

In Hong Kong, badly hit by the SARS virus, which claimed 299 lives locally in 2003, residents have donned surgical masks on the streets and public transport in recent days, despite no local cases of the Wuhan infection being confirmed.

—Stephanie Yang contributed to this article.

From: Patel, Anita (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 10:56 AM
To: Parashar, Umesh (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/DVD) [REDACTED] (b) (6); Burns, Erin (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) [REDACTED] (b) (6); Cohn, Amanda (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) [REDACTED] (b) (6); Gerber, Susan I. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/DVD) [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: Nordlund, Kristen (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: RE: WSJ article

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-virus-discovered-by-chinese-scientists-investigating-pneumonia-outbreak-11578485668>

see if this works

From: Parashar, Umesh (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/DVD) [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 10:54 AM
To: Burns, Erin (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) [REDACTED] (b) (6); Patel, Anita (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) [REDACTED] (b) (6); Cohn, Amanda (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) [REDACTED] (b) (6); Gerber, Susan I. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/DVD) [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: Nordlund, Kristen (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: WSJ article

Are you able to access and share the full article? Don't have a subscription.

From: Burns, Erin (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 10:30 AM
To: Patel, Anita (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) [REDACTED] (b) (6); Cohn, Amanda (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Gerber, Susan I. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/DVD) <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>; Parashar, Umesh (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/DVD) [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: Nordlund, Kristen (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) <[REDACTED] (b) (6)>
Subject: FW: WSJ article

No confirmation of WSJ report of coronavirus.

From: Greene, Carolyn M. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <(b) (6)>
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 10:28 AM
To: Millman, Alexander J. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <(b) (6)>; Simonds, R. J. (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD) <(b) (6)>
Cc: Burns, Erin (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <(b) (6)>; Nordlund, Kristen (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/OD) <(b) (6)>; Fowlkes, Ashley C. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: WSJ article

Thank you, Alex.
cg

From: Millman, Alexander J. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <(b) (6)>
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 10:27 AM
To: Greene, Carolyn M. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <(b) (6)>; Simonds, R. J. (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD) <(b) (6)>
Subject: Re: WSJ article

I am still not seeing anything else officially reported. The Avian Flu Diary which usually picks things up pretty quickly mentions that this article cites an unnamed source and also is unable to find any other official statements yet.

<https://afludiary.blogspot.com/2020/01/wsj-report-links-novel-coronavirus-to.html?m=1>

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Greene, Carolyn M. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <(b) (6)>
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 11:10:01 PM
To: Simonds, R. J. (CDC/DDPHSIS/CGH/OD) <(b) (6)>; Millman, Alexander J. (CDC/DDID/NCIRD/ID) <(b) (6)>
Subject: WSJ article

Talking to Alex now—concern whether statement in WSJ article about novel CoV detected is true or not....Alex doesn't see anything on Health Commission site. R3 wants report soon.

Please let me know if you find out more and so sorry for late call.
Thank you,
cg

Carolyn Greene, MD
Associate Director for Influenza Preparedness and Response
Field Site Support Unit Lead, Influenza Division
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Office: <(b) (6)>
Cell: <(b) (6)>

REL0000484933

From: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=5C55F75B58F14AB2B2CCBAC0A881CCAE- (b) (6)]
Sent: 2/4/2020 6:11:06 PM
To: NIAID Budget Request [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=81111cc4f7af4cf1bb3a765ede8750ba (b) (6)]
CC: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6) Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbedc2d3a003- (b) (6) Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6ad94c8f809d41ad91b1f78754f60c54- (b) (6) Lu, Tami (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=683d9f298f344f53b273ce527aa15d9a- (b) (6)]
Subject: FW: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research
Attachments: GRADS Coronavirus Search.xlsx

Dear Budget Team,

Apologies if this is a duplicate request. DMID has requested the amount of funding that was provided for the attached awards for China only. There are four awards on the attached spreadsheet.

AI051915
AI061092
AI079231
AI110964

I appreciate any assistance if you can help provide this information.

Thank you!

Joyelle

Joyelle Kalei Dominique, MS, MBA
Acting Director

Office of Global Research
Office of Science Management and Operations
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
5601 Fishers Lane, Room 1E42, MSC 9802
Bethesda, MD 20892-9802

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(b) (6)

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From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 4:28 PM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
<(b) (6)> Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E]

REL0000484947

< [REDACTED] (b) (6) >

Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Dear Gayle, Ping, and Erik,

Using GRADS, the attached list of awards was identified when searching the coronavirus categories in association with China. Would it be possible to get the following information for each award (only one is active):

- What research is/was being conducted in country?
- How much funding was supporting the in country research?
- What institutions and who at those institutions were conducting the research? The comprehensive word document you provided contains this information for award AI110964.

Happy to discuss.

And, thank you again for all of your help today.

Thanks,
Andrew

Andrew Q. Ford, Ph.D.
Office of Scientific Coordination and Program Operations
Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
NIAID/NIH/DHHS
5601 Fishers Lane Room 7G64
Rockville, MD 20892

[REDACTED] (b) (6)

[REDACTED] (b) (6)

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From: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 3:36 PM

To: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] < [REDACTED] (b) (6) >

Cc: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6); Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E]

[REDACTED] (b) (6); Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6); Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E]

[REDACTED] (b) (6); Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)

Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hi Andrew,

Here is a draft of brief information of the grants on your list. The source of information is QVR/FACTS.

Let us know if additional information is needed at this time.

Kind regards,
Gayle

REL0000484947

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>

Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 2:39 PM

To: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)O.V.>

Cc: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E]

(b) (6) Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6) Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E]

(b) (6) Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)

Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hi Andrew,

Gayle and I found only 3 NIAID grants with Chinese collaborators on SARS or MERS.

One is the grant awarded to EcoHealth, Peter Daszak and his Chinese collaborators include Dr. Shi Zhengli in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

2 R01 AI110964-06, 2019, Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence. It includes 3 Chinese investigators from WIV (a CAS institute), 2 from Institute of Pathogen Biology (a CAMS institute), and 1 from East China Normal University.

The publication you sent has two Chinese authors, Shi, Zhengli and Ge, Xing-yi. In the acknowledgement the NIAID funding contributed to this publication was from the other authors. USAID's fund partially supported Dr. Shi for her work to this paper. The Chinese funding agency contributed partially for Dr. Shi and full for Dr. Ge for their work for this paper. NIAID funding did not support Dr. Shi or Dr. Ge for the work that used in this publication.

I attached the manuscript from Dr. Shi on the identification of 2019-nCoV. In the acknowledgement no NIAID funding is mentioned.

Two active grants on viral vaccine design with Chinese collaborators are found in QVR. The U.S. PI on the grant is Du, Lanying, New York Blood Center.

5 R01 AI139092-02, 2019—Structure-based design of coronavirus subunit vaccines

5 R01 AI137472-03, 2020—Rational design and evaluation of novel mRNA vaccines against MERS-CoV

The grants have the same Chinese collaborator, Dr. Zhou, Yusen, who is a researcher in the Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, an institute under the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS). According to the information in FACTS for DoS clearance Dr. Zhou's expertise and resources in China include his skills in developing animal models for viruses, such as Zika, and then successfully applying the models to evaluate therapeutics. Specifically, Dr. Zhou's resource, the Zika NHP model, has already been able to show that they can evaluate antibodies in this model, which makes it well set-up to test the nanobodies that are the subject of the grant (this is the justification for collaborating with Dr. Zhou on a R21 grant for Zika. Zhou has extensive animal model experience, not just limited to Zika).

The work to be performed at Dr. Zhou's lab for the two R01 grants is to carry out efficacy studies of vaccine candidates, which are developed in Dr. Du's lab domestically, in a NHP challenge model for MERS-CoV. NIH grant fund is not used to support the NHP studies at Dr. Zhou's lab. Intramural fund from Dr. Zhou's institute will pay for the study.

Erik and Gayle can add if I miss any information.

Please let me know if the information is helpful.

Ping

From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hey Gayle and Ping,

Attached is the 2015 paper that was identified over the weekend. I think Dr. Shi is the only investigator in China, by I may be incorrect.

Thanks,
Andrew

Andrew Q. Ford, Ph.D.
Office of Scientific Coordination and Program Operations
Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
NIAID/NIH/DHHS
5601 Fishers Lane Room 7G64
Rockville, MD 20892

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 10:39 AM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hey Gayle,

Thank you for speaking with me. Per our discussion, below are the award numbers and/or investigators we are interested in understanding more about their association with Chinese researchers/institutions. I would be happy to discuss. Thanks - Andrew

NIAID

- R01AI110700
- AI110964
- U19AI109761
- U19AI107810
- AI085524
- F32AI102561

Other NIH Institutes

- K99AG049092

REL0000484947

- DK065988

Investigators

- Ralph Baric
- Peter Daszak
- Zhengli-Li Shi (investigator at Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China)
- Fang Li
- Richard Whitley
- Mark Denison
- Chien-Te Tseng

Andrew Q. Ford, Ph.D.

Office of Scientific Coordination and Program Operations

Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases

NIAID/NIH/DHHS

5601 Fishers Lane Room 7G64

Rockville, MD 20892

(b) (6)

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From: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=5C55F75B58F14AB2B2CCBAC0A881CCA- (b) (6)]
Sent: 2/4/2020 2:28:05 PM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)] Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=d86ecadfb6864db6af60890a49c60017 (b) (6)]
CC: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]; Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6ad94c8f809d41ad91b1f78754f60c54- (b) (6)]; Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=1ceb55d4b673477391c9da8a3eb3c75c (b) (6)]; Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=585133d3fa194f06aa618678b2817c22- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hi Ping/Gayle,

Cristina Casseti reached out to me this morning. Can you please confirm that this information includes a summary of what is in FACTS for the China specific request (when one does exist)? I noted that in many cases there was no China component.

Thanks!

Joyelle

Joyelle Kalei Dominique, MS, MBA
Acting Director

Office of Global Research
Office of Science Management and Operations
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
5601 Fishers Lane, Room 1E42, MSC 9802
Bethesda, MD 20892-9802

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(b) (6)

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From: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 3:36 PM
To: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hi Andrew,

Here is a draft of brief information of the grants on your list. The source of information is QVR/FACTS.

Let us know if additional information is needed at this time.

REL0000484950

Kind regards,
Gayle

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 2:39 PM
To: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hi Andrew,

Gayle and I found only 3 NIAID grants with Chinese collaborators on SARS or MERS.

One is the grant awarded to EcoHealth, Peter Daszak and his Chinese collaborators include Dr. Shi Zhengli in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

2 R01 AI110964-06, 2019, Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence. It includes 3 Chinese investigators from WIV (a CAS institute), 2 from Institute of Pathogen Biology (a CAMS institute), and 1 from East China Normal University.

The publication you sent has two Chinese authors, Shi, Zhengli and Ge, Xing-yi. In the acknowledgement the NIAID funding contributed to this publication was from the other authors. USAID's fund partially supported Dr. Shi for her work to this paper. The Chinese funding agency contributed partially for Dr. Shi and full for Dr. Ge for their work for this paper. NIAID funding did not support Dr. Shi or Dr. Ge for the work that used in this publication.

I attached the manuscript from Dr. Shi on the identification of 2019-nCoV. In the acknowledgement no NIAID funding is mentioned.

Two active grants on viral vaccine design with Chinese collaborators are found in QVR. The U.S. PI on the grant is Du, Lanying, New York Blood Center.

5 R01 AI139092-02, 2019—Structure-based design of coronavirus subunit vaccines

5 R01 AI137472-03, 2020—Rational design and evaluation of novel mRNA vaccines against MERS-CoV

The grants have the same Chinese collaborator, Dr. Zhou, Yusen, who is a researcher in the Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, an institute under the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS). According to the information in FACTS for DoS clearance Dr. Zhou's expertise and resources in China include his skills in developing animal models for viruses, such as Zika, and then successfully applying the models to evaluate therapeutics. Specifically, Dr. Zhou's resource, the Zika NHP model, has already been able to show that they can evaluate antibodies in this model, which makes it well set-up to test the nanobodies that are the subject of the grant (this is the justification for collaborating with Dr. Zhou on a R21 grant for Zika. Zhou has extensive animal model experience, not just limited to Zika).

The work to be performed at Dr. Zhou's lab for the two R01 grants is to carry out efficacy studies of vaccine candidates, which are developed in Dr. Du's lab domestically, in a NHP challenge model for MERS-CoV. NIH grant fund is not used to support the NHP studies at Dr. Zhou's lab. Intramural fund from Dr. Zhou's institute will pay for the study.

Erik and Gayle can add if I miss any information.

Please let me know if the information is helpful.

Ping

From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6); Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hey Gayle and Ping,

Attached is the 2015 paper that was identified over the weekend. I think Dr. Shi is the only investigator in China, by I may be incorrect.

Thanks,
Andrew

Andrew Q. Ford, Ph.D.
Office of Scientific Coordination and Program Operations
Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
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5601 Fishers Lane Room 7G64
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From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 10:39 AM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hey Gayle,

Thank you for speaking with me. Per our discussion, below are the award numbers and/or investigators we are interested in understanding more about their association with Chinese researchers/institutions. I would be happy to discuss. Thanks - Andrew

NIAID

- R01AI110700
- AI110964
- U19AI109761
- U19AI107810
- AI085524
- F32AI102561

REL0000484950

Other NIH Institutes

- K99AG049092
- DK065988

Investigators

- Ralph Baric
- Peter Daszak
- Zhengli-Li Shi (investigator at Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China)
- Fang Li
- Richard Whitley
- Mark Denison
- Chien-Te Tseng

Andrew Q. Ford, Ph.D.

Office of Scientific Coordination and Program Operations

Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases

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From: Touchette, Nancy (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=0AC9C36A14DA43C0B720120C49D50867- (b) (6)]
Sent: 2/7/2020 9:09:25 PM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6)] Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]
Subject: notes from today
Attachments: Chinese Embassy Visit to NIAID.docx

Importance: High

Ping and Gayle

I am sending here somewhat detailed notes in he-said, she-said format just to document/record discussion. Please fill in any missing details as you see fit. In the meantime I will work on paring this down and reorganizing around themes discussed and action items.

Nancy

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REL0000484954

**Chinese Embassy Visit to NIAID
February 7, 2020; 10-11 a.m.
5601 Fishers Lane, Room 3F-100**

Meeting Notes

Delegation from Chinese Embassy:

- Mr. Futao Chen, S&T Minister Counsellor
- Mr. Zhongcheng Wang, S&T Counsellor
- Mr. Jiangrui Chen, S&T Second Secretary
- Mr. Mai Wan, S&T Counsellor Attaché

NIAID Participants

In room

- Mr. Gray Handley - Associate Director for International Research Affairs
- Dr. John Beigel - Associate Director for Clinical Research, Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (DMID)
- Dr. Alan Embry - Chief, Respiratory Diseases Branch, DMID
- Ms. Gayle Bernabe - Regional Officer, Office of Global Research (OGR)
- Dr. Ping Chen - International Health Specialist, OGR
- Dr. Nancy Touchette - Health Research Program and Policy Analyst, OGR
- Dr. Marissa Tan, Johns Hopkins Preventive Medicine Fellow, OGR

On phone

- Dr. Hilary Marston - Medical Officer/Policy Advisor, Office of the Chief of Staff
- Dr. Karen Bok- Senior Advisor, Vaccine Development, Vaccine Research Center
- Dr. Nicholas Bushar - Chief, Policy, Planning and Reporting Section; Office of Strategic Planning, Initiative Development, and Analysis
- Dr. Vincent Munster, Senior Investigator, Viral Ecology Unit, Rocky Mountain Laboratories
- Han Kan, Office of Global Affairs, HHS
- Dr. Karen Bok- Senior Advisor, Vaccine Development, Vaccine Research Center
- Dr. Nicholas Bushar - Chief, Policy, Planning and Reporting Section; Office of Strategic Planning, Initiative Development, and Analysis
- Dr. Christine Sizemore, Director of International Relations, Fogarty International Center
- Ms. Joyelle Dominique, Acting Director, OGR

Introductions

Gray Handley thanked everyone for coming, and expressed excitement for the discussion and prospect of working together. He pointed out that NIAID's coronavirus experts were in the room and on the phone and that we have substantial research activity focused on coronaviruses. He also mentioned NIAID's ability to provide direct and indirect funding, and acknowledged the robust partnerships we already have with the NSFC, CAMS, and the many Chinese investigators who have trained in the United States and participate in many of our research networks. He expressed hope that our partnership can be

rapidly expanded to work on the current 2019-nCoV outbreak, and asked that NIAID staff on the phone and in the room introduce themselves and their role in coronavirus research at NIAID.

Karin Bok, Senior advisor for Vaccine Development at the VRC; responsible for moving Phase I clinical trials into advanced development and helping coronavirus vaccine

Hilary Marston, Medical Officer and Policy Advisor to the Director; coordinating NIAID nCoV response

Nicolas Bushar, Office of Strategic Planning, Initiative Development, and Analysis; helping Hilary to coordinate nCoV response

Joyelle Dominique, Acting Director, OGR

Mukul Ranjan, Senior Advisor for Innovation and Technology Transfer, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Office; helps with tech transfer and IP issues

Christine Sizemore, Director of International Relations, FIC; helps to coordinate research activities across NIH

Han, Khan(?), Office of Global Affairs, HHS; met with Chinese Embassy delegation at HHS last week

John Beigel, Assistant Director for Clinical Research at DMID

Alan Embry, Chief, Respiratory Diseases Branch, DMID

Ping Chen, former NIAID staff in Beijing

Gayle Bernabe, Regional Program Officer for East Asia, OGR

Nancy Touchette, Health Policy and Program Analyst, OGR

Mr. Futao Chen, from the Chinese Embassy then discussed the research priorities related to the public threat from CoV of the Embassy and his role in facilitating cooperation; he represents the Ministry of Science&Technology and is coordinating CoV research. He noted that the ministry is focused on research aimed at understanding the nature of the virus. They have pursued using currently available drugs and have found encouraging results, identifying 3 potential drugs that they believe may affect the virus. They are also looking into herbal medicine remedies that may have an effect, but these results need to be confirmed. Currently, diagnostic kits are especially important, and Mr. Chen noted that six companies are providing 7 different kits that have shown to be effective for diagnosing NCoV.

He noted that results for developing a vaccine have not come so fast, with scientists from the United States and China both predicting that the earliest trial will not likely start for three months. Which for the Chinese seems to be a long time, but is a short time by NIAID standards. Mr. Chen also expressed concern that with such a long time frame for approval, companies will have less incentive to develop and manufacture vaccines for nCoV. The Chinese government is investing in vaccine research but it takes time and most of their effort has been focused on containing the outbreak. He also noted that the number of new suspected cases remains at ~5000 and may be leveling off somewhat, and not increasing exponentially; this may be a sign that they are containing the virus, according to Mr. Chen. Most cases (~2/3) are in Hubei province and the case fatality rate outside Hubei is lower.

Mr. Chen said that the first priority of the Chinese ministry of science and technology is diagnostics. Other priorities are testing available drugs for activity against nCoV and vaccine development. The main purpose for requesting a meeting was to hear about NIH/NIAID research and identify areas in which NIAID and China can work together.

Gray noted that there are always hurdles but he hopes that the delegation can help us do our job to move as quickly as possible.

Mr Jiangrui Chen, another member of the delegation, mentioned the national international service system (?) provides access to data for foreigners [something about CAMS?]he also noted that a clinical trial conducted in China identified six medications with activity against 2019-nCoV:

- Lopinavir
- Ritonavir(?)
- Ribavirin
- Alpha-interferon
- Others(?)

John Beigel mentioned that lopinavir and ritonavir are in trials to treat infected individuals (in Japan?), but interferon is not yet in trials. He also mentioned that ribavirin was used to treat patients with SARS. Alan Embry noted that he had hear ribavirin was being considered for testing along with interferon as a potential treatment for nCoV

Gray said it would be helpful to have contact information for Chinese PIs doing coronavirus research, with permission to contact them, to facilitate collaboration between U.S. and Chinese researchers.

Karin bok said that the VRC has experience working on coronaviruses, including MERS and SARS. They have engineered the 2019-nCoV and have been working with Moderna to put the new sequence into Moderna's RNA platform; they are working with Moderna to move from Phase I trials to GMP (?)production. The trials, which will start in 2-3 months will hopefull answer the questions: How fast can we go? And how far/fast (?) can we develop collaborations. She also noted that CEPI will be funding GMP production. She also talked about monoclonal antibodies but said they are not isolating them in-house. They have existing antibodies that might cross react with nCoVand they have also obtained blood samples from the patient in Washington State and hope to isolate antibodies from his PBMCs

Gray said that it is not too early to start thinking about setting up subsequent clinical trials; it would be helpful to start identifying sites to test any vaccine candidates that make it through Phase I testing. It is not too early to start developing a clinical protocol. He also noted that U.S. scientists have been struggling to get samples and PBMCs and acknowledged the sensitivity of the subject, but asked if there is a way to manage sample sharing through an expedited process.

John Beigel said that DMID is sponsoring a Phase I vaccine study. Goal is to start the second week of March. The study will involve three cohorts receiving different doses of vaccine. Each participant will receive 2 doses 28 days apart. However, they will not know which is the best dose until June (based on safety/immunoreactivity and immunogenicity). Once the vaccine dose is determined, how do we move to a larger study to assess safety and efficacy? He noted that Moderna is interested in working with them on this trial. He said the mRNA platform allows them skip certain steps, because the safety of the platform has already been tested, and offers the speediest route to vaccine development and testing. Phase I study will (begin?) in five weeks. They are looking for safety/tolerability with a good immunogenic response. As soon as the protocol for the Phase I study is finished and the trial starts, they will start writing the protocol for a Phase II/III study. They will work with the FDA and IRB to get agreement to move forward, but the earliest the Phase II study could begin would be early July. Name of

vaccine is m1273. The vaccine platform was developed by Moderna. VRC devised a way to construct and stabilize the mRNA of the 2019-nCoV spike protein, then sent to Moderna to use with their lipid nanoparticle vaccine platform. VRC/NIAID could license the technology for stabilizing the mRNA to others. Other groups/companies also have lipid nanoparticle platforms.

Vincent Munster discussed RML efforts to develop vaccine candidates and said they were trying adenovirus vectors and different mRNA approaches using CEPI funding. They will test these candidates in vitro and in animal models.

Alan Embry said that a number of developers are working to develop vaccine candidates. Many of these studies are funded by CEPI. The goal is to cast a wide net and try to identify to most promising candidates to move to clinical trials. He said they anticipate that the m1273 candidate will be highly immunogenic. He also talked about mAbs and that academics and companies are trying to screen PBMCs for antibodies; some researchers are also looking at serum from convalescent SARS patients for antibodies that could protect against the new virus. Alan also mentioned that DMID can offer testing and evaluation resources, preclinical testing, toxicology and small and large animal testing. DMID works to lower risk to industry in developing vaccines and therapeutics.

Gray mentioned that NIAID has issued a notice for grantees to apply for supplementary funding. The amount of supplementary awards are limited by the current grant, but Alan said that they are trying to accelerate research as much as possible. There are already many ongoing collaborations between U.S. and Chinese researchers, but the grant supplements offer real opportunities to build on joint activities. With joint programs with NSFC and CAMS, each side funds their own researchers.

Vincent discussed the international effort by NIAID to work broadly to develop multiple vaccines. With this epidemic, we may want the capacity to offer more than one vaccine. He said his lab is pursuing every opportunity. Looking at vaccine candidates containing the SARS binding domain in a recombinant vaccine candidate and is also looking at DNA vaccines, mRNA vaccines, and live vectors such as adenovirus, chimp AdOX (?), and MVA vectors. Several companies are also investigating nanoparticle vaccine platforms.

In terms of therapeutics, Alan said DMID is surveying the landscape for currently licensed protease and nuclease inhibitors and monoclonal antibodies and hope to begin Phase I/II trials on approved drugs for other indications. John Beigel said they are setting up for a multi-arm study looking at remdesivir vs. placebo that will be similar to the PALM study for Ebola therapeutics. Could drop candidate drugs into different arms of the study and add mAbs when a viable candidate is identified; DMID has engaged with U.S. and international networks to plan such a study. He noted that they are also engaging with WHO to develop a master protocol that could be used across many different studies; WHO has not yet circulated their protocol. But such an approach will allow multiple trials to consolidate data. NIAID is happy to help investigators starting to plan trials, in any way they can. WE can share protocols, resources, etc. and we can provide review and expertise for the Chinese, if wanted.

One of the Chinese officials (third one from the right) asked whether American companies coordinate in any way in terms of data collection and information, and asked about the process for making interventions available for emergency use. They also asked whether anyone was collecting or coordinating data on the clinical course of disease in patients.

Hilary Marston responde that within the USG, HHS has the lead in coordinating activities. ASPR and BARDA lead the advanced development of interventions and hand off to industry. CDC conducts some communication with physicians, but the primary mode of communication is through publications. Case reports are published individually and there is no one tasked centrally collecting information.

In terms of diagnostics, alan explained that CDC takes the lead, establishing the diagnostics protocol and distributing kits to state and local health departments. Multiple platform technologies are being incorporated into diagnostics and reagents are being made to qualify platforms.

Vincent mentioned that RML is setting up diagnostic kits for distribution to Africa to test for nCoV and they are coordinating with WHO and CEPI.

Alan said NIAID is interested in learning more about viral dynamics, the course of human infections, surveillance of human and host reservoirs. He mentioned collaboration with the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Other issues of interest include how are patients treated. How do patients present and how can we understand who will progress to severe disease. Are there immunological markers that can predict. Gray added that we are interested in these studies as well as basic biology of the virus. Also, would like to better understand transmission dynamics, host factors, and whether asymptomatic transmission is really occurring. He asked the Chinese what they could share regarding these questions.

Dr. Chen asked if we are developing any new diagnostics and John mentioned that we are working with Cepheid to get the nCoV into the XPert system. Also, BARDA is developing Biofire as a diagnostic.

Gray asked for information about what they are funding: Dr. Chen responded that they are here to understand what we are doing and how we can collaborate. They will report back to MOST to get guidance on what they are willing to do. Gray asked about opportunities to share data and samples, and Mr. Chen acknowledged that opportunities are there, but he cannot give a clear answer at this point. He asked NIAID to provide a list of what we want , which they can send to MST to what they are able to share.

Jiangrui Chen asked whether the Moderna platform has been used for other viruses and John mentioned that it has been used to develop vaccine candidates for influenza H7 and H10, Zika, CHIKV, and CMV. They have had to change the lipid configuration , but the current formula has been tested in 3 studies.

[The third person...Mr. Wang?] said they can share epi information outside of Wuhan (Wuhan epidemiology is beyond their capacity right now). But for other areas, cases are provided on a municipal website: <http://nmdc.cn/#/nCoV>

Mr. Chen that there is evidence for asymptomatic transmission and there are clues that it occurs but studies are a big challenge. They would like to know when people start and stop shedding the virus [something about 15 seconds??]

Summary of discussion (by Gray)

- We are enthusiastic about collaborating and supporting Chinese scientists; we value collaboration and would like to move quickly past any hurdles
- We would like to contact scientists in China and to link to our U.S. scientists, particularly for developing countermeasures, animal studies, and transmission studies; we would like permission to contact Chinese scientists
- We would appreciate any advice on how we could share data and samples; for example guidance on accessing PBMCs to develop mAbs
- We would welcome the opportunity to work together on clinical protocols and to work together to make sure the WHO protocols make sense
- Do we need an ongoing coordinating mechanism, such as bilateral working group, engaging scientific leaders so we can continue this discussion;
 - we are happy to serve as coordinators/POC for research collaboration
 - May go to higher levels (HHS/BARDA) to coordinate on production
 - May want to set up subgroups to further discuss specific topics (drugs, vaccines, e.g.)
- If it helps with MOST, we are happy to exchange letters to document any collaboration

From: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=5C55F75B58F14AB2B2CCBAC0A881CCAE- (b) (6)]
Sent: 2/4/2020 6:56:46 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13 (b) (6); Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=d86ecadfb6864db6af60890a49c60017 (b) (6); Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c78e95b3db24482ba3dcbdedc2d3a003- (b) (6) Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=585133d3fa194f06aa618678b2817c22- (b) (6)]
CC: Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6ad94c8f809d41ad91b1f78754f60c54- (b) (6)i]; Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=1ceb55d4b673477391c9da8a3eb3c75c- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research
Attachments: GRADS Coronavirus Search.xlsx

Hi Andrew,

To add on, attached are the numbers from the budget office.

Joyelle Kalei Dominique, MS, MBA
Acting Director

Office of Global Research
Office of Science Management and Operations
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
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From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2020 1:55 PM
To: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hi Andrew and all,

I only focused on the Chinese collaborators on AI110964 to address #3 of your questions. Please see the attachment.

I included links to the institutes. Most of them have the English version online.

I can only find where the 2014-2018 money went to the Chinese institutes in FACTS but not the 2019 and 2020 breakdown at the institute level.

REL0000484956

If you want to know what the actual research/work that NIAID fund had supported, you would have to ask Erik for the info. Can't get that kind of information from FACTS.

I can't find the collaborator, Zhu, Guangjian at the East China Normal University. This investigator is different from the previous one in the same university. PI of the grant, Peter Daszak can provide information. It could simply a spelling error for the name. East China Normal University has someone named Zhu, Guangqian but this person is not in biomedical research.

Let me know if you need more information on Chinese institutes or collaborators.

Thank you

Ping

From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 4:28 PM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6) Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E]
(b) (6) Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6) Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E]
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Dear Gayle, Ping, and Erik,

Using GRADS, the attached list of awards was identified when searching the coronavirus categories in association with China. Would it be possible to get the following information for each award (only one is active):

- What research is/was being conducted in country?
- How much funding was supporting the in country research?
- What institutions and who at those institutions were conducting the research? The comprehensive word document you provided contains this information for award AI110964.

Happy to discuss.

And, thank you again for all of your help today.

Thanks,
Andrew

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5601 Fishers Lane Room 7G64
Rockville, MD 20892

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To: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hi Andrew,

Here is a draft of brief information of the grants on your list. The source of information is QVR/FACTS.

Let us know if additional information is needed at this time.

Kind regards,
Gayle

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 2:39 PM
To: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)> Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Cc: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Dominique, Joyelle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Rosa, William (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6); Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
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One is the grant awarded to EcoHealth, Peter Daszak and his Chinese collaborators include Dr. Shi Zhengli in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

2 R01 AI110964-06, 2019, Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence. It includes 3 Chinese investigators from WIV (a CAS institute), 2 from Institute of Pathogen Biology (a CAMS institute), and 1 from East China Normal University.

The publication you sent has two Chinese authors, Shi, Zhengli and Ge, Xing-yi. In the acknowledgement the NIAID funding contributed to this publication was from the other authors. USAID's fund partially supported Dr. Shi for her work to this paper. The Chinese funding agency contributed partially for Dr. Shi and full for Dr. Ge for their work for this paper. NIAID funding did not support Dr. Shi or Dr. Ge for the work that used in this publication.

I attached the manuscript from Dr. Shi on the identification of 2019-nCoV. In the acknowledgement no NIAID funding is mentioned.

Two active grants on viral vaccine design with Chinese collaborators are found in QVR. The U.S. PI on the grant is Du, Lanying, New York Blood Center.

5 R01 AI139092-02, 2019—Structure-based design of coronavirus subunit vaccines

5 R01 AI137472-03, 2020—Rational design and evaluation of novel mRNA vaccines against MERS-CoV

The grants have the same Chinese collaborator, Dr. Zhou, Yusen, who is a researcher in the Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, an institute under the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS). According to the information in FACTS for DoS clearance Dr. Zhou's expertise and resources in China include his skills in developing animal models for viruses, such as Zika, and then successfully applying the models to evaluate therapeutics. Specifically, Dr. Zhou's resource, the Zika NHP model, has already been able to show that they can evaluate antibodies in this model, which makes it well set-up to test the nanobodies that are the subject of the grant (this is the justification for collaborating with Dr. Zhou on a R21 grant for Zika. Zhou has extensive animal model experience, not just limited to Zika).

The work to be performed at Dr. Zhou's lab for the two R01 grants is to carry out efficacy studies of vaccine candidates, which are developed in Dr. Du's lab domestically, in a NHP challenge model for MERS-CoV. NIH grant fund is not used to support the NHP studies at Dr. Zhou's lab. Intramural fund from Dr. Zhou's institute will pay for the study.

Erik and Gayle can add if I miss any information.

Please let me know if the information is helpful.

Ping

From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6) Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Cc: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: RE: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hey Gayle and Ping,

Attached is the 2015 paper that was identified over the weekend. I think Dr. Shi is the only investigator in China, by I may be incorrect.

Thanks,
Andrew

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From: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 10:39 AM
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED]> (b) (6)
Subject: NIH/China - Coronavirus Research

Hey Gayle,

Thank you for speaking with me. Per our discussion, below are the award numbers and/or investigators we are interested in understanding more about their association with Chinese researchers/institutions. I would be happy to discuss. Thanks - Andrew

NIAID

- R01AI110700
- AI110964
- U19AI109761
- U19AI107810
- AI085524
- F32AI102561

Other NIH Institutes

- K99AG049092
- DK065988

Investigators

- Ralph Baric
- Peter Daszak
- Zhengli-Li Shi (investigator at Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, China)
- Fang Li
- Richard Whitley
- Mark Denison
- Chien-Te Tseng

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From: Touchette, Nancy (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=0AC9C36A14DA43C0B720120C49D50867 (b) (6)]
Sent: 2/28/2020 6:57:35 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=e86e86eeef44552b2918975f5001d13- (b) (6)]
Subject: RE: SCMP: Chinese laboratory that first shared coronavirus genome with world ordered to close for 'rectification', hindering its Covid-19 research

Ahh. I figured that out after reading the whole article. They were being punished. That is too bad.

From: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 1:54 PM
To: Touchette, Nancy (NIH/NIAID) [E] <(b) (6)>
Subject: RE: SCMP: Chinese laboratory that first shared coronavirus genome with world ordered to close for 'rectification', hindering its Covid-19 research

What this means that the Chinese government did not like the lab because it did not have the permission from the government to share the information. So the government closed it

From: Touchette, Nancy (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 1:40 PM
To: Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Subject: FW: SCMP: Chinese laboratory that first shared coronavirus genome with world ordered to close for 'rectification', hindering its Covid-19 research

What does this mean: "closed for rectification"? any idea what this is about?

N.

From: Folkers, Greg (NIH/NIAID) [E] (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 12:41 PM
Subject: SCMP: Chinese laboratory that first shared coronavirus genome with world ordered to close for 'rectification', hindering its Covid-19 research

Chinese laboratory that first shared coronavirus genome with world ordered to close for 'rectification', hindering its Covid-19 research

- No reason was given for the closure of Shanghai facility, which released information about the virus ahead of authorities
- One source at the laboratory said the closure has hampered scientists' research when they should be 'racing against the clock'



Zhuang Pinghui in Beijing

Published: 11:00pm, 28 Feb, 2020

Updated: 12:49am, 29 Feb, 2020



The genome sequence was released on open platforms for scientists. Photo: Handout

The Shanghai laboratory where researchers published the world's first genome sequence of the deadly coronavirus that causes Covid-19 has been shut down.

The laboratory at the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre was ordered to close for "rectification" on January 12, a day after Professor Zhang Yongzhen's team published the genome sequence on open platforms. It closed temporarily the following day.

The release of the data helped researchers develop test kits for the virus.

"The centre was not given any specific reasons why the laboratory was closed for rectification. [We have submitted] four reports [asking for permission] to reopen but we have not received any replies," a source with the centre said, requesting anonymity because of the matter's sensitivity.

"The closure has greatly affected the scientists and their research when they should be racing against the clock to find the means to help put the novel coronavirus outbreak under control," the source said.

The laboratory is a Level 3 biosafety facility, the second highest level, and passed an annual inspection by the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment on January 5. It also obtained the required credentials to conduct research on the coronavirus on January 24.

It was not clear whether the closure was related to the publishing of the sequencing data before the authorities.

The closure order was issued by the Shanghai Health Commission. Five telephone calls to officials at the commission seeking comment on the closure were not picked up. A fax sent to the commission requesting comment was not answered.

China's National Health Commission announced hours after the release by Zhang's team that it would share the genome sequence with the World Health Organisation. It later emerged that the information had been sent through the officially designated Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Zhang's team isolated and finished the genome sequence of the then-unknown virus on January 5, two days before China's official announcement that mysterious pneumonia cases in Wuhan were caused by a hitherto unknown coronavirus.

The Shanghai centre reported its discovery to the National Health Commission on the same day and recommended “relevant prevention and control measures” be taken in public places, because the patient from whom the sample was collected had suffered very severe symptoms and the virus resembled a group previously found in bats.



The laboratory at the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre Shanghai was ordered to close a day after sharing the genome sequence. Photo: AFP

The team made the finding public on January 11 after it saw that the authorities had taken no obvious action to warn the public about the coronavirus.

At the time, the public was told that no new cases had been reported in Wuhan since January 3 and there was no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission.

“It was not about any individual’s achievements. It’s about having biological test kits ready in face of a previously unknown respiratory disease, especially when a large part of the population [was] moving [across the country] during the Lunar New Year holidays,” said a source close to Zhang’s team, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

It shared the data on virological.org, an open platform for discussions, and GenBank, an open-access data repository, and said researchers were welcome to download, share, use and analyse the data.

Within a week of its publication, several companies in China announced that they had developed diagnosis kits for the virus.

The findings by Zhang’s team were published in the scientific journal *Nature* on February 3. The research said the virus sample was collected from a patient who showed symptoms of fever, dizziness and coughing and was admitted to a Wuhan hospital on December 26.

The Shanghai centre has a long-term cooperation relationship with Wuhan Central Hospital. The patient was identified as a 41-year-old male vendor who worked at the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market in Wuhan, which was believed to be a key link of infections at the early stage of the outbreak.

The lab’s closure not only affected Zhang’s research but also studies by other scientists since it is an open facility, according to another researcher with knowledge of the matter.

“There have been applications from research institutes and universities to try drugs and compare the effects of different treatment and the development of vaccines, but [all these will have] to be turned down. Closing down the laboratory also affects the studying of the virus,” the researcher said.



Zhuang Pinghui

Based in Beijing, Zhuang Pinghui joined the Post in 2004 to report on China. She covers a range of issues including policy, healthcare, culture and society.

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